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Abstract
Large sectors of the Kurdish movement in Turkey have progressively come to discuss, 
develop and/or endorse models of so-called “democratic autonomy”. While there are 
several works in the field detailing and critiquing Turkey’s policies vis-à-vis the Kurds, 
the international legal dimension of the Kurdish democratic autonomy proposal in its 
own right has received far less attention to date. The present article seeks to fill this 
gap by reflecting upon the internal coherence and consistency of the democratic au-
tonomy argument in light of international law standards and practice, with particular 
reference to internal self-determination in Turkey. I argue that any future settlement of 
the Kurdish question will require not only Turkey’s compliance with its own human 
rights obligations, but also the Kurdish movement’s ability to negotiate the accommo-
dation of its aspirations in ways that are consistent with international human rights 
law.
Keywords
democratic autonomy – Kurds – self-government – Turkey – international law – 
self-determination
1 Introduction: The Faces of the Kurdish Question
The Kurdish communities in Turkey and across the wider Kurdistan region 
have gradually articulated their demands on the states that partly overlap this 
historical region (primarily Turkey) for what has been often referred to as the 
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“democratic solution” to the Kurdish question.1 Broadly speaking, the different 
and largely interwoven iterations of pro-Kurdish claims over time have  involved 
the end of military confrontations or otherwise repressive policies, broad ideas 
of democratisation, and forms of decentralisation of power or  decision-making 
authority.2
Prompted by the initial configurations of the democratic solution fostered 
by Abdullah Öcalan, the historical leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(pkk), in the 1980s and 1990s, large sectors of the Kurdish movement have pro-
gressively come to discuss, develop and/or endorse models of so-called “demo-
cratic autonomy” in Turkey and beyond. Indeed, the pkk leadership and its 
subsequent political constellations have insisted that such form of autonomy 
should be seen in the broader context of what they call “democratic confeder-
alism”, namely the wider grassroots-based and self-rule-based restructuring of 
the Middle Eastern states where the Kurds live – not only Turkey, but Syria, 
Iraq and Iran too.3
1 I am most grateful to Cenzig Gunes, Jan Klabbers, Markku Suksi, Azi Chalabi and the anony-
mous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I should hasten to 
clarify that, in light of regional variations, I shall speak of a “Kurdish movement” to refer, 
more narrowly, to the entire political spectrum of Turkey-based entities that are seeking a 
permanent settlement of the Kurdish question, regardless of their different ramifications 
and connotations. It encompasses established pro-Kurdish political parties whose agenda 
includes, but is not limited to, the articulation of Kurdish claims. In a similarly synthetic vein, 
I shall speak of a “Kurdish argument” or “Kurdish claims” in order to capture the overarching 
gist of the Kurdish position in Turkey, unless differences or nuances within the Kurdish 
movement ought to be noted.
2 For useful historical accounts, see e.g. Janet Klein, ‘The Minority Question: A View from His-
tory and the Kurdish Periphery’, in Will Kymlicka and Eva Pfösti (eds.), Multiculturalism and 
Minority Rights in the Arab World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) p. 27; David Romano 
and Mehmet Gurses (eds.), Conflict, Democratisation, and the Kurds in the Middle East:  Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2014); Cengiz Gunes, The Kurdish National 
Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance (Routledge, London, 2012); Cengiz Gunes and 
Welat Zeydalioğlu (eds.), The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Repre-
sentation, and Reconciliation (Routledge, London, 2014).
3 See below, section 2. Consistent with our premise (supra note 1), it should be noted that the 
article does not discuss the democratic autonomy proposal in the context of each of those 
states; although the repression of Kurdish demands is a typical feature of such states’ policies 
throughout history (for a wide range of human rights issues, see e.g. Stefan Oeter, ‘The Kurds 
between discrimination, autonomy and self-determination’, in Peter Hilpold (ed.), Autonomy 
and Self-determination: Between Legal Assertions and Utopian Aspirations (Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing Ltd, Cheltenham, 2018) p. 208), the current analysis assumes the different social and 
political circumstances in which Kurdish issues have arisen over time, and thus does not 
engage with the question of how, apart from Turkey, the Kurdish argument affects the  specific 
legal/institutional context of those states, whatever its regional ramifications on a  conceptual/
historical level. For these distinctive historical trajectories, see e.g Romano and Gurses (eds.), 
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Much has been written on Turkey’s (and the other above states’) chronic 
hostility to the accommodation of Kurdish rights following the partitioning of 
Kurdistan after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.4 From an international 
law and human rights perspective, the discussion has been built mainly around 
the interpretation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which effectively entrenched 
the rise of the Republic of Turkey and its relationship to neighbouring states, 
and/or the multiple human rights issues linked to the politics of repression 
against the Kurds that punctuated that country’s various military coups.5 Such 
matters have continued to seriously taint Turkey’s engagement with interna-
tional (especially European) organisations and the international community 
at large, including the most recent reescalation of the military conflict in 
south-east Turkey and northern Syria.6
Less known – arguably understated – in human rights/international law dis-
course is the extent to which the conceptual structure of the Kurdish argu-
ment, as captured by the idea of democratic autonomy, interfaces with the 
conceptual and practical underpinnings of international human rights catego-
ries and standards. In fact, while there are several works in the field detailing 
and critiquing Turkey’s policies vis-à-vis the Kurds, the international legal 
supra note 2; Mohammed M.A. Ahmed, Iraqi Kurds and Nation-Building (Palgrave Macmil-
lan, London, 2012); Abbas Vali, Kurds and the State in Iran (Tauris, London, 2011).
4 A key element of the analysis is the exclusionary nature of the (Kemalist/Turkish and Arab) 
nationalisms that emerged in post-Ottoman territories and the various Kurdish responses: 
see e.g. Klein, supra note 2, p. 44; David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (Tauris, 
London, 2004) p. 115 et seq.
5 See, for example, Baskin Oran, ‘The Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne 
Peace Treaty and Current Issues’, in Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat (ed.), Human Rights in Turkey 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006) p. 35; Charles G. MacDonald and Car-
ole A. O’Leary, Kurdish Identity: Human Rights and Political Status (University Press of Flori-
da, Gainesville, 2007); Derya Bayir, ‘Turkey, the Kurds, and the legal contours of the right to 
self-determination’, 1 Kurdish Studies (2013) p. 5. However, for a broader perspective, see the 
early assessment by Ove Bring, ‘Kurdistan and the Principle of Self-Determination’, 35 Ger-
man Yearbook of International Law (1992) p. 157; and more recently Oeter, supra note 3.
6 Mustafa Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict has Surged Again. Here is Why’, The Washington 
Post, 21 March 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?destination=%2fnew
s%2fmonkey-cage%2fwp%2f2017%2f03%2f21%2fhow-competition-helped.-then-hurt-
kurds-in-turkey%2f%3f>, visited on 10 October 2019; Patrick Kingsley, ‘Who Are the Kurds, 
and Why Is Turkey Attacking Them in Syria?’, The New York Times, 14 October 2019, <https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/the-kurds-facts-history.html>, visited on 18 
October 2019; see also Hakan Kolcak, ‘A More but not Fully Constructed. Arena: A Critical 
Analysis of the akp’s Policy toward Kurdish Ethno-Cultural Rights (2002–2014), 5 The Age of 
Human Rights Journal (2015) p. 63; Edel Hughes, ‘The European Union Accession Process: 
Ensuring the Protection of Turkey’s Minorities?’, 17 International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights (2010) p. 561.
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 dimension of the Kurdish democratic autonomy proposal as such (i.e. regard-
less of Turkey’s position, or more general Kurdish claims or their purely politi-
cal or ideological dimensions) has received far less attention to date. What 
 follows seeks to fill this gap by reflecting upon the internal coherence and con-
sistency of the democratic autonomy argument in light of international law 
standards and practice, with particular reference to internal self- determination 
in Turkey.
The following analysis is thus structured around two fundamental issues: 
the evolving position of the Kurds in Turkey in relation to democratic autono-
my, and the conceptual significance of such a position in terms of interna-
tional human rights standards and self-determination practice. I will first 
 discuss the Kurdish argument as such (section 2) and then explore it, in three 
steps, against the international legal context (sections 3–4), including a legal 
understanding of the Kurds as a group (section 3.1), the substantive human 
rights categories that operate as a background to the Kurdish argument (sec-
tion 3.2), and finally an assessment of their implications for internal self- 
determination in Turkey (section 4). I will argue that while several key ele-
ments of the democratic autonomy proposal closely engage international law 
and the  evolving law of self-determination in particular, other elements of 
that proposal may require further conceptual refining as part of a continual-
ly   adjustable set of institutional goals to be pursued in negotiation with the 
government.
2 What Do the Kurds in Turkey Want?
The numerous political iterations of Kurdish claims over the past two decades 
have built the democratic solution to the Kurdish question around at least 
three, largely interwoven, conceptual categories. One is the notion of “com-
munity” or “nation”; the other is the concept of “democracy”; and the third one, 
which encompasses both of them, revolves around the articulation of “auton-
omy”. Each of these concepts (or clusters of concepts) is of course used 
 variously in the political theory and sociology literature to refer to several 
 collective and/or institutional dimensions. This is not the place for dissecting 
such multiple, often overlapping, understandings. Suffice it to say that each of 
them attracts core meanings or basic distinctions, whether it is the politically 
or culturally defined community (political and cultural nationalism) – further 
conceptualised as instrumentally or intrinsically worthy, related or unrelated 
to state-building, exclusionary or supportive vis-à-vis other groups’ aspirations, 
insulated or integrated into a wider diverse communal context – a view of 
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 democracy as quintessentially defined by popular control over decision- 
making by those affected by it, on the basis of equality, or, relatedly, a minimal 
view of autonomy as some form of self-governance by a group over matters of 
importance to it.7
Interestingly, in the context of the Kurdish position, all of these categories (or 
elements of them), are designed to interact to varying degrees with the sub-
state, state and trans-national or trans-border levels in ways that essentially 
map into the territorial configuration of Kurdistan and the states that inherit-
ed Kurdish population groups following its partition at the end of the First 
World War.
The Kurdish argument builds upon the idea of a Kurdish community, or 
 indeed a Kurdish nation, by looking at both the substantive meaning of Kurd-
ish identity and the wider societal context in which such identity should be 
recognised. For one thing, the rights of the Kurdish “people” and the quest for 
the recognition of its “national identity” feature in important texts of the pkk 
and its subsequent institutional ramifications.8 On the other hand, the general 
7 The purpose of this section is conceptual and explanatory rather than normative, in the 
sense that I shall not attempt to fit the Kurdish argument into any specific theoretical 
(normative) conception of those categories, although elements of the argument may self-
evidently resonate more clearly with some such conceptions than with others. See e.g. Mi-
chael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging (bbc Books, London, 1993); on nationalist conceptions 
and aspirations, see recently Neil Walker, ‘Teleological and Reflexive Nationalism in the new 
Europe’, in Jacint Jordana, Michael Keating, Axel Marx and Jan Wouters (eds.), Changing Bor-
ders in Europe: Exploring the Dynamics of Integration, Differentiation and Self-Determination 
in the European Union (Routledge, London, 2019) p. 163; for a fuller articulation of this long-
standing debate, see infra note 13. For an integrated vision of a ‘community of communities’, 
see also Azadeh Chalabi, National Human Rights Action Planning (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2018) pp. 17–19; Dwight Newman, Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical 
Framework for Rights Held by Groups (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011). On democracy as popu-
lar control and political equality, see David Beetham, Democracy and Human Rights (Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 1999), ch. 1; see more broadly, the overview by Mark E. Warren, ‘Democracy 
and the State’, in John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig and Anne Phillips (eds.), The Oxford Hand-
book of Political Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) p. 382. On a minimal under-
standing of autonomy as a political-constitutional mechanism, see the osce High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities, The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of 
National Minorities in Public Life & Explanatory Note, September 1999; the non-territorial 
version of autonomy is often linked, in the political science literature, to the national cultural 
autonomy model proposed by Karl Renner and Otto Bauer in the face of a collapsing Austro-
Hungarian Empire: for discussion, see Ephraim Nimni (ed.), National Cultural Autonomy and 
Its Contemporary Critics (Routledge, London, 2005).
8 See, for example, the position expressed in the pkk’s monthly magazine Serxwebûn: ‘De-
mokratik Özerklik’, 301 Serxwebûn (2007) p. 57 (as translated by Cenzig Gunes, ‘Unpacking 
the “Democratic Confederalism” and “Democratic Autonomy”: Proposals of Turkey’s Kurdish 
Movement’, in Olgun Akbulut and Elçin Aktoprak (eds.), Minority Self-Government in Europe
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institutional model underpinning the Kurdish position is not the nation-state, 
as Öcalan and the broader Kurdish leadership see it, but what they call a “dem-
ocratic nation” or a “democratic national community”.9 While a strictly mono-
cultural view of the nation-state does not tolerate group diversity and works 
towards assimilating minority groups into the majority’s practices, Öcalan’s 
conceptual view of a democratic nation is not defined by a “single language, 
culture, religion and interpretation of history”, but by “plurality and communi-
ties as well as free and equal citizens existing together and in solidarity”.10
Crucially, a nation is understood, on this view, as “a community of people 
who share a common mindset”, and a democratic nation one that rests on the 
“self-government of communities and individuals who share a similar mindset 
through their own will”.11 Politically at least, this entails an inclusive view of 
national identity both in Turkey (and the other states where the Kurds live) 
and within Kurdish societies themselves. In other words, the articulation of 
nationhood in this context seeks to combine the distinctiveness of Kurdish 
identity (language and culture more generally) within and across state bound-
aries, with a wider liberationist project that speaks to all groups within Kurdis-
tan (e.g. across gender and ethnicity), and the states where Kurdish-populated 
areas exist.12 In this sense, neither statehood nor ethnocentrism can explain 
the Kurdish argument. Rather, the latter’s ambition is to provide a model of 
pluralist society that moves beyond exclusivist ethno-nationalism, identity-
blind (seemingly neutral) civic views of the state, or a combination of both.13
 and the Middle East: From Theory to Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2019) 
p. 260).
9 Abdullah Öcalan, Demokratik Uygarlik Ҫözümü, Fifth Volume (Amara Yayıncılık, 2015) 
pp. 52–53, 469 (as translated by Gunes, supra note 8, p. 252; Naif Bezwan, ‘Addressing the 
Kurdish Self-Determination Conflict: Democratic Autonomy and Authoritarianism in 
Turkey’, in Ephraim Nimni and Elҫin Aktoprak (eds.), Democratic Representation in Pluri-
national States: The Kurds in Turkey (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018) p. 59 et seq., at 
pp. 66–67.
10 Abdullah Öcalan, The Political Thought of Abdullah Öcalan: Kurdistan, Woman’s Revolu-
tion and Democratic Confederalism (Pluto Press, London, 2017) p. 108.
11 Ibid.
12 This appears to be the case both in relation to Öcalan’s largely Marxist-oriented and liber-
tarian thinking, and the more recent political manifesto of the hdp, <http://www.hdp 
.org.tr/parti/parti-programi/8> (2012), visited on 10 December 2019.
13 For the complex debate over the intertwining of political and cultural dimensions to the 
concept of nation, see e.g. Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Blackwell Publish-
ers Ltd, Oxford, 1986); Federico Chabod, L’idea di nazione (Editori Laterza, Bari, 1962); Er-
nest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1983); David Miller, 
On Nationality (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997); Benedict Henderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso, London, 1983); 
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This approach to Kurdish nationalism closely relates to a broad understand-
ing of democracy as a political and institutional framework within which the 
accommodation of Kurdish claims is thought to be possible. The core idea of 
democracy effectively operates as a free-standing notion that is then deployed 
in various argumentative directions. As probably most clearly articulated in 
the early 2000s by the Kongra-Gel (Kurdistan People’s Congress), democracy is 
not seen as a tool “to further the interest or domination of a class, nation, eth-
nic or religious group”; rather, it stands for a political regime “in which every 
group has the right to self-expression regardless of their power”.14 Such eman-
cipatory and cross-cutting view of democracy feeds into at least three types of 
narratives: 1) the constitutional restructuring of Turkey (and the other relevant 
states) along the lines of a systemic democratisation that involves the constitu-
tional recognition of distinct group identities, primarily (though not exclusive-
ly) in the form of language and education rights; 2) the democratisation of 
Kurdish society whereby a tailored form of self-administration – from local 
villages up to higher-level self-governing structures – is expected to deepen 
and pluralise people’s identity and ability to participate more effectively in 
decision-making; and 3) the development of Kurdistan as a case of democratic 
confederalism to the extent that such form of self-administration coordinates 
sub-state governing levels across the region and generates representation and 
participation of all groupings within Kurdistan.15
The deployment of “democracy” as a free-standing political-institutional 
category essentially aims to generate empowerment and participation for the 
Kurds and other groups regardless – indeed, short of – a Kurdish state. This is 
especially clear in the context of democratic confederalism that is under-
stood as a way of realising a degree of self-government in Kurdistan without 
Isaiah Berlin, ‘Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power’, in Henry Hardy (ed.), Against 
the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas (The Hogarth Press, London, 1979) p. 333; Yael 
Tamir, Why Nationalism (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2019); Walker, supra note 7.
14 Kongra Gele Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel), Program, Tuzuk ve Kararları (Weşanên Serxwebûn, 
2004) p. 90. The entity was created following the pkk’s cessation of all political activity in 
2002, and the abolishment of the immediate successor to it in 2003, the Kurdistan Free-
dom and Democracy Congress. The vision of democracy articulated in its programme is 
nevertheless linked to a wider project of “radical democracy” initiated by the pkk: see 
Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya and Joost Jongerden, ‘Confederalism and autonomy in Turkey: The 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the reinvention of democracy’, in Gunes and Zeydalioğlu 
(eds.), supra note 2, p. 186.
15 Although the disentanglement of such narratives can be useful for analytical purposes, a 
significant degree of overlap amongst the conceptual categories that underpin those 
 narratives can be found in various articulations of the Kurdish argument, as it normally 
presents the idea of self-government on the back of a more general call for societal 
pluralism.
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 challenging the territorial sovereignty of the states that variously incorporated 
its lands.16 This view of “non-state democracy”,17 far from rejecting the existing 
state structures, becomes effectively a call for a longer-term negotiated solu-
tion with Turkey and the other states based on the recognition of pluralism 
and grassroots-level involvement in political processes. It is meant to operate 
as democracy below the surface of the existing state, not in the context of a 
newly established one. It should be noted that not all Kurdish movement 
 political actors have embraced the idea of transnational democratic confeder-
alism or are otherwise actively pursuing it.18 However, virtually all such actors 
do not link the notion of democracy or democratisation up with any form of 
 secessionist claim. Whether it is transnational in character or, as is most often 
the case, a project specific to Turkey,19 “non-state self-government” of the sort 
indicated above is presented as a model of political participation that can 
 account for diversity within and outside of the Kurdish community and ulti-
mately promote revised constitutional frameworks that affect state societies 
from within.
That this is in fact the key objective of the Kurdish argument as it stands 
is  borne out by the conceptualisation of autonomy – indeed, democratic 
 autonomy – as an internal institutional arrangement designed to achieve a 
suitable accommodation of Kurdish demands while at the same time enhanc-
ing the democratic credentials and legitimacy of the state as a whole. There are 
essentially two layers to the democratic autonomy concept, primarily or exclu-
sively  related to Turkey. One is the recognition of the identity of the Kurdish 
community and other groups through a new constitutional regime based on a 
revised, pluralistic notion of Turkey’s national identity or nationality, which 
allows for the free and equal manifestation and protection of those national 
and religious group identities that are actively nurtured within society.20 This 
 central strand of the concept goes as far as to advocate forms of autonomy that 
16 Abdullah Öcalan, The Political Thought of Abdullah Öcalan: Kurdistan, Woman’s Revolu-
tion and Democratic Confederalism (Pluto Press, London, 2017) p. 47; this is reflected in the 
Preface to the Union of Kurdistan Communities’ so-called ‘Contract’, adopted in 2005: 
kck, kck Sözleşmesi, < https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/KCK_S%C3%B6zle%C5%9Fmesi>, 
visited on 15 December 2019.
17 Gunes, supra note 8, p. 258.
18 As noted by Cenzig Gunes and Ҫetin Gürer, “[in] contrast with the pkk’s objective 
of building a pan-Kurdish hybrid entity in the Middle East, for the hdp, the objective of 
democratic autonomy is to reform Turkey’s political system” (‘Kurdish Movement’s Dem-
ocratic Autonomy Proposals in Turkey’, in Nimni and Aktoprak (eds.), supra note 9, p. 165.
19 Ibid.
20 This is most clearly expounded in the hdp’s political manifesto: see supra note 12; see also 
Selahattin Demirtaş, ‘The Middle East, The Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey, and Radical 
Democracy’, 13 Turkish Policy Quarterly (2015) p. 27.
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include state-wide community representative bodies tasked with managing 
aspects of the group’s identity such as mother tongue education, thereby es-
tablishing forms of self-administration based on group membership instead of 
territorial settlement.21 Whatever the actual scope of the arrangement linked 
to historical and political circumstances, its incorporation into the democratic 
autonomy concept rests on bottom-up participation in decision-making as the 
litmus test of genuine group recognition by the state.
The other aspect of this concept involves a broad process of decentralisa-
tion of power across Turkey, which is expected to translate into self-governing 
local and regional units. The claim made by various key pro-Kurdish political 
parties, of which the hdp is the latest iteration, essentially points to the cre-
ation of territorially-defined self-governing regions across the country as a way 
of decentralising (and thus democratising) the constitutional structure of the 
state. A significant implication of this would be also the bringing together of 
Kurdish-majority provinces (“benign” gerrymandering) on the basis of pre- 
defined competences agreed upon as part of a comprehensive agreement with 
the central government.22 Three points are worth noting here. Firstly, the roll-
ing of territorial and non-territorial solutions into the democratic autonomy 
concept reflects Kurdish demography in Turkey, since a significant number of 
Kurds lives in western Turkey rather than south-eastern Anatolia. Secondly, 
where taken in the context of a democratic nation and democracy itself as 
outlined above, the articulation of autonomy as a political and institutional 
category remains within the parameters of an overall constitutional restruc-
turing of Turkey; it is not intended to herald the establishment of some form of 
sub-state ethnocracy in disguise so much as to challenge the culturally 
 monolithic and tightly centralist view of Turkey as a nation-state.23 Thirdly, the 
local self-government model that is being proposed – from communes or 
 villages to provincial councils – also represents essentially a model of  grass-root 
associationism that can operate (partly at least) regardless of the entrench-
ment of self-government within a revised constitutional framework.24
21 Gunes and Gürer, supra note 18, p. 168. Unsurprisingly, the idea of non-territorial self-
governance has resonated with discussions about the early model of national cultural 
autonomy proposed by Austro-Marxists Renner and Bauer at the turn of the last century 
(see supra note 7).
22 For an overview of political party positions, see Gunes, supra note 8, pp. 262–264.
23 For insightful reviews of the development of Turkish nationalism as a project of ethnic 
homogenisation, see, for example, Perry Anderson, ‘Kemalism’, 30 London Review of Books 
(2008) p. 3; Cenzig Gunes and Welat Zeydalioğlu, ‘Introduction: Turkey and the Kurds’, in 
Gunes and Zeydalioğlu (eds.), supra note 2, p. 1; Derya Bayir, Minorities and Nationalism in 
Turkish Law (Routledge, London, 2013).
24 The point here is that this form of civil society networking and coordination can be part-
ly  supported by private law-based forms of “personal autonomy” protected by general 
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In the end, the argument for a democratic solution to the Kurdish question 
seeks to combine, in dynamic ways, identity recognition, institutional reform, 
and enhanced rights protection for all. It appeals, somehow simultaneously, to 
Kurdish belonging and inter-communal respect and social intersectionality, to 
democracy within an existing state jurisdiction and democracy without state-
building (i.e. as direct, “non-state”, involvement in decision-making through 
self-government). While the gist of the political argument (against some of the 
above conceptualisations of first-order categories) is reasonably clear, despite 
its multidimensionality and ultimate hybridity (for example, across parame-
ters of liberal and radical democracy), the conceptual and institutional impli-
cations of that argument raise, as noted, the question of its overall consistency 
with international law. One can argue that, aside from Turkey’s policies and 
obligations in the field, for the democratic autonomy concept to function, it 
requires a legal understanding of the Kurds as a group and of the extent to 
which their demands can and should be accommodated. With this in mind, 
the next two sections will, respectively, address the position of the Kurds as an 
ethno-cultural or ethno-national community (section 3.1), examine the more 
substantive international (human rights) framework and categories as a back-
ground to the Kurdish argument (section 3.2), and finally discuss the interface 
between democratic autonomy and internal self-determination in Turkey 
(sections 4.1–4).25
3 International Legal Dimensions of the Kurdish Argument
3.1 Conceptualising the Kurds in Turkey
The most typical starting point in almost all articulations of Kurdish claims is 
the distinctiveness of Kurdish identity as a collective socio-cultural reality in 
Turkey and across the region, despite linguistic variations across Kurdistan and 
specific socio-political circumstances in the states where the Kurds live.26 
 associative freedoms. For this minimal understanding of autonomy, see Markku Suksi, 
‘Personal Autonomy as Institutional Form – Focus on Europe Against the Background to 
Article 27 of the iccpr’, 15 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2008) pp. 
160–161. More broadly, on the role of civil society networks as a significant contextual fac-
tor in addressing power deficits and realising human rights, see Chalabi, supra note 7, pp. 
29–31.
25 The following analysis does not assume, let alone focus on, any prospect of Kurd-
ish   independence across the region, though it does provide insights into external self- 
determination elements that can be usefully contrasted with the implications of the dem-
ocratic autonomy proposal.
26 For the broader context, see supra notes 2, 3. Despite a common western Iranian linguistic 
origin, Kurdish dialects, of which the most widely spoken ones are Kurmanji (primarily in 
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 Unsurprisingly, this strong and time-honoured sense of communal belonging, 
one that survived the fragmentation of Kurdish areas in the first post-war ter-
ritorial reconfiguration of the Middle East, has traditionally fuelled claims to 
self-determination for the Kurds as a people or nation.27
In Turkey, which is the focus of our discussion, the claim has taken on spe-
cial significance as sectors of politically active Kurds have linked such claim to 
the Kurdish community being a “constitutive nation” or otherwise one of the 
founding peoples of the Republic of Turkey given their major contribution to 
the early 1920s War of Independence alongside the “Turks”.28 Partly in support 
of this approach is the pre-Lausanne Constitution of modern Turkey approved 
by the Grand National Assembly in 1921, which did not specifically endorse this 
characterisation of the Kurds, yet did adopt a fairly inclusive understanding of 
“nation”, “people” and “self-determination”. Crucially, it featured in Article 11 a 
commitment to provincial autonomy via a specific autonomy law that was pri-
marily meant in the eyes of the drafters to benefit Kurdish-populated lands.29 
In the context of the more recent democratic autonomy proposals the point 
has been broadly echoed in the specific demand, mainly by the pkk, for the 
constitutional recognition “of the national identity of the Kurdish people” as a 
basis for a new political union of the state.30
This strand of the Kurdish argument appears problematic to the extent 
that it aims to be grounded on the right to self-determination of “peoples” in 
southeast Turkey) and Sorani (primarily in northern Iraq) do not coalesce around a single 
‘official’ Kurdish language. See also Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaik and State: The So-
cial Political Structures of Kurdistan (Zed Books Ltd, London, 1992).
27 See, for example, Abbas Vali, Kurdish Nationalism: Identity, Sovereignty and the Dialectics of 
Violence in Kurdistan (Tauris, London, 1996); Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and 
Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia, rev. ed., 1996) p. 178.
28 Oran, supra note 5, p. 44. He aptly distinguishes Turkish sub-identity within the Ottoman 
Empire from the transformation of that identity into the supra-identity of the Republic of 
Turkey (ibid., pp. 50–52); Büşra Ersanlı and Günay Göksu Özdoğan, ‘Obstacles and oppor-
tunities: recent Kurdish struggles for political representation and participation in Turkey’, 
35 Southeastern Europe (2011) pp. 67–68.
29 Olgun Akbulut, ‘Legal Background of Autonomy Arrangements in Turkey from Historical 
Perspective’, in Akbulut and Aktoprak (eds.), supra note 8, p. 235. Article 1 of the 1921 Con-
stitution vested sovereignty in the “nation without condition”, and the system of govern-
ment in self-determination “by the people”. In 1920, Atatürk had promised “Turks and 
Kurds” to be part of a pluralistic notion of nation, involving respect for Kurdish identity 
and autonomy in the regions where they predominantly lived (see Anderson, supra note 
23, p. 9). For the later decline of this stance, see Bayir, supra note 23, ch. 4.
30 See supra note 8.
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 international law. Providing a historical overview of this right within the inter-
national legal system is well beyond the purposes of this article.31 However, 
some critical points about the tensions within the notion of “peoplehood” 
should be made here. When taken in isolation from the wider ramifications of 
the  democratic autonomy concept, the Kurdish “co-founding” national view 
can be traced back to Wilsonian self-determination in its attempt, including in 
the post-Ottoman territories, to combine political and cultural nationalism, 
 democracy and group identity, by either supporting consent-based nation- 
building projects or underwriting the accommodation of national groups 
within wider political and cultural communities.32 In this sense, that view 
functions (conceptually at least) not only on the back of the 1921 Constitution 
of Turkey, but also the pre-Turkey commitment to the autonomy, and possibly 
independence, of culturally or nationally distinct Kurdistan under the 1920 
Treaty of Sévres.33
When we look closely at the evolution of self-determination in internation-
al law in the post-war period and across much of the 20th century, what we see, 
though, is the fairly regular subordination of the peoplehood or nationhood 
claim (in the broadly cultural sense) to considerations of territorial stability. It 
essentially meant that those groups who viewed themselves as cultural nations 
were either denied a transition to separate statehood on purely national 
grounds,34 or required to accommodate other national groups within a new 
31 For a wide range of perspectives, see among others James Crawford, ‘The Right of Self- 
Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’, in Philip Alston, Peo-
ples’ Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) p. 6; James Summers, Peoples and Inter-
national Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of 
Nations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2007).
32 US President Wilson’s Fourteen Points Address to Congress, 8 January, 1918, point xii (re-
garding the “autonomous development” of the nationalities under now Turkish rule); Al-
fred Cobban, National Self-Determination (Oxford University Press, London, 1944); Michla 
Pomerance, ‘The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian 
Conception’, 70 American Journal of International Law (1976) p. 1; Michla Pomerance, Self-
Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations (Martinus 
 Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1982).
33 Treaty of Sévres, 10 August 1920, Part iii, Section iii, Kurdistan (Articles 62 to 64).
34 In the famous Aaland Islands case from the early 1920s, the League of Nations did not 
endorse the national argument as a self-sufficient basis for state-making in international 
law. See e.g. The Aaland Islands Question (On Jurisdiction), Report of the International 
Committee of Jurists, League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 3 (1920); 
The Aaland Islands Question (On the Merits), Report by the Commission of Rapporteurs, 
League of Nations Council Document B7 21/68/106 (1921).
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state,35 or effectively subsumed into a broader territorial unit in which their 
identity played (legally and politically) no specific role.36 It is true that all of 
this happened in the context of claims to state-making rather than internal 
constitutional restructuring. However, the broader point is that the overarch-
ing territorial paradigm endorsed – de jure or de facto – by the international 
community at various historical junctures in addressing self-determination 
disputes constantly struggles to reconcile with a more substantive, cultural 
 understanding of national identity that generally underlies claims to national 
self-determination.
The upshot of this pattern has been a certain level of hybridity, or even am-
biguity, around the notions of “people” or “nation” in international legal 
 discourse, not only because of the frequently contested nature of its precise 
subjective membership and/or objective, territorial extension,37 but also, and 
more pragmatically, because of the rather typical unwillingness on the part of 
adjudicators and policy-makers (and obviously states alike) to settle this sort of 
controversy by definitional fiat. In the Reference case, for example, the  Supreme 
Court of Canada walked a thin line between conventional advocacy of the 
right of a “people” to self-determination and the recognition of the legitimacy 
of national claims as a central assumption of the way in which those conversa-
tions between the central government and Quebec should be  conducted. 
It conceded that self-determination may benefit a portion of the state’s 
 population and that self-determination itself is normally fulfilled through 
 internal arrangements, as opposed to territorial changes in sovereignty. As the 
35 See e.g. the Polish Minority Treaty, 28 June 1919 (as a legal framework for Polish national 
independence).
36 From a post-colonial perspective, see, for example, Anthony Anghie, ‘Nationalism, Devel-
opment and the Postcolonial State: The Legacies of the League of Nations’, 41 Texas Inter-
national Law Journal (2006) pp. 455–462; Mohammad Shahabuddin, ‘Post-colonial 
Boundaries, International Law, and the Making of the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar’, 9 
Asian Journal of International Law (2019) p. 334. Interestingly, from a political science 
standpoint, Walker Connor was one of the first scholars to bring this element into focus: 
‘Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?’, 24 World Politics (1972) pp. 319–55. In terms of 
modern Turkey, Martin van Bruinessen notes (mutatis mutandis) that “[i]t is surprising 
how long scholarship on Turkey has allowed itself to be led by the self-view of the Kemal-
ist elite and has managed to evade the question of ethnicity in Republican Turkey” (Walk-
er Connor, Race, culture, nation and identity politics in Turkey: Some comments, presented 
at the Mica Ertegün Annual Turkish Studies Workshop on Continuity and Change: ‘Shift-
ing State Ideologies from Late Ottoman to Early Republican Turkey, 1890–1930’, Depart-
ment of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, 24–26 April, 1997).
37 One of the clearest socio-historical misfits is the one between “nation” as a culturally ho-
mogenous entity and “state” as a political-institutional mechanism: hardly any state is the 
reflection of a single such entity.
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Court ruled out Quebec’s unilateral right to secession, it crucially noted that, 
for the problem at hand to be addressed, establishing the status of the Quebec 
population as a “people”, or a “people” amongst other “peoples” within Quebec, 
was not necessary.38
The case tells us something very important about the fine, yet real divid-
ing  line between convincingly articulating an argument about peoplehood 
in  (international) law and dealing with, acknowledging, the co-existence of 
sub-state national claims as part of the legal process. In practice, the Court’s 
finding of a constitutional duty on the parties to negotiate the terms of self-
determination affecting the population as a whole appealed to the socio- 
cultural reality of the groups in question rather than their precise legal stand-
ing from a self-determination perspective.39 In the far more dramatic case of 
the 1990s war in Bosnia, the EC Badinter Commission similarly eschewed the 
peoplehood  argument in addressing the legality of the self-determination 
claim made by the Bosnian Serbs, yet acknowledged a whole host of rights 
under inter national and national law that benefitted them as “population”, 
“minority” and/or “ethnic group” within the state.40
From this specific point of view, the Catalan case does not reflect an entirely 
different pattern, despite the fact that its logic wholly derives (on the face of it) 
from Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution.41 The Constitutional Court of Spain 
has dismissed the claim that the Catalan people are a “people” in a legal sense, 
but has still recognised the historical or cultural representation of Catalonia as 
a “national reality” to be a “perfectly legitimate idea”.42 This idea links up, 
 directly or indirectly, with a “legitimate political aspiration” of Catalan citizens 
38 Constitutional Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 
125.
39 The Court generically appeals to the “whole of the people or peoples resident within the 
territory”: ibid., para. 130.
40 European Community Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, 11 January 1992, 31 Interna-
tional Legal Materials (1992) p. 1497. One should also note that in the later, post- Yugoslavia, 
Kosovo case, the International Court of Justice refrained from recognising the popula-
tion of Kosovo, or indeed the Kosovar Albanians, as a people in a legal sense: Accordance 
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
22 July 2010, icj, Advisory Opinion, paras. 51, 56, 82, 89, 105, 109, <https://www.icj-cij.org/
files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>, visited on 10 January 2019.
41 For a good overview of the case, see Lucía Payero-López and Ephraim Nimni, ‘The Liberal 
Democratic Deficit in Minority Representation: The Case of Spain’, in Gaetano Pentas-
suglia (ed.), Ethno-Cultural Diversity and Human Rights: Challenges and Critiques (Marti-
nus  Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2018) p. 90, at p. 104 et seq.
42 ccj 31/2010, 28 June 2010. Thus, for the Court, there is no such thing as a “people of Catalo-
nia” for the purpose of its Statute of Autonomy and of defining Catalonia as a “nation” (as 
opposed to “nationality”) in a legal and constitutional sense (Legal Bases, 9, 12).
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to decide the future status of Catalonia as long as this is achieved in accor-
dance with some constitutional parameters.43 Here again, the attempt to iden-
tify in law some procedural way forward on the path to reconciling competing 
claims does not depend on establishing the claimant as a “people” but is rather 
linked to a process that can give legitimacy (and legality) to sub-state national 
groups’ standing and voice.
In short, while there is nothing in international law that prohibits an 
 extension of the “people” category to communities who view themselves as 
nations, either through specific state legislation/constitutional settlement 
or  specific international instruments,44 a prudential reading of the Kurd-
ish  argument would militate against taking the constitutional recognition of 
the Kurds as a “nation” or “constitutive nation” as a non-negotiable sine qua 
non,  i.e. as the only way of achieving a credible measure of “national” self- 
determination within Turkey. Rather than pursuing group status precision as 
the end state (or starting point) of constitutional developments, the Kurdish 
 argument should be seen through the lens of the various forms of legal and 
institutional recognition of sub-state groups’ aspirations (e.g. including lan-
guage, forms of jurisdiction, or symbolic representation) as a legitimate socio- 
cultural reality.
From an international law perspective, this in practice means working at 
the intersection of group existence within a wider political community, and 
alongside other groups, and an adjustable set of political and legal objectives. 
While this approach can and should foster an overarching, more pluralist 
 understanding of Turkey’s national identity, seemingly in the spirit of the 1921 
Turkish Constitution, it also seeks to maximise, more pragmatically and more 
immediately, the impact of the broad variety of group accommodation mecha-
nisms recognised by international human rights law on the gradual (poten-
tially incremental) accommodation of Kurdish demands, including key 
 elements of the democratic autonomy proposal.
Most of these mechanisms are ordinarily associated with national minori-
ties, or minority nations, or otherwise cultural communities traditionally 
 established within certain territories, such as indigenous peoples.45 Although 
43 For a reconstruction of the constitutional position and its potential, see Eduardo J. Ruiz 
Vieytez, ‘Minority Nations and Self-determination: A Proposal for the Regulation of Sov-
ereignty Processes’, 23 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2016) p. 402, at 
pp. 411–413.
44 For the hybrid and highly contingent nature of some such ad hoc developments, see 
Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘Do Human Rights Have Anything to Say about Group Autonomy?’, 
in Pentassuglia (ed.), supra note 41, at pp. 144–146.
45 See, for example, Marc Weller (ed.), Political Participation of Minorities: A Commentary on 
International Standards and Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010); Christine 
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sectors of the Kurdish movement have voiced concerns about the characterisa-
tion of the Kurds in Turkey as a national minority, since they see it as a second-
class status against the role of a co-founding nation that they claim –  something 
of a replica of the second-class status afforded to non-Muslim millets (Greek 
Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish) under Ottoman rule46 – there are a number 
of reasons that indicate why such concerns are not necessarily well-placed. 
The millet system, for all its imperfections and the inequality on which it rest-
ed vis-à-vis the Muslim majority within the Ottoman Empire, has nevertheless 
attracted praise for its ability to recognise the value of group autonomy, with 
minimal interference from the central authorities.47 It was not based on “mi-
nority rights” (or rights of “minorities” or “minority” status) per se, and yet 
it  provided a model that, if reworked in line with contemporary human 
rights standards, could represent a useful basis for addressing at least some of 
the non-territorial cultural claims that underlie the democratic autonomy 
proposal.48
It should also be noted that the core understanding of a national minority in 
international law (i.e. regardless of whatever variations on the concept may be 
claimed in human rights practice or deemed acceptable to states) arguably 
goes a long way towards valuing the role of the group as historically integral to 
the state-making process, consistent with the Kurdish argument. For example, 
Recommendation 1735 on the concept of “nation”, adopted in 2006 by the 
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, describes national minorities 
or  communities as a “cofounding entity” of the nation-state, a by-product 
of   multiple reallocations of sovereign power across the international sys-
tem throughout history. It calls for acceptance of the right “of all individuals 
to   belong to the nation that they feel they belong to, whether in terms of 
Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008) ch. 11; Tove Malloy and Francesco Palermo (eds.), Minority Accom-
modation through Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy (Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford, 2015).
46 For this critique, see the works cited in supra note 28.
47 See, for example, a useful review by Ephraim Nimni, ‘The Conceptual Challenge of Non-
Territorial Autonomy’, in Ephraim Nimni, Alexander Osipov and David Smith (eds.), The 
Challenge of Non-Territorial Autonomy: Theory and Practice (Peter Lang AG, Bern, 2013) pp. 
17–19.
48 Ibid.; Elçin Aktoprak, ‘The Kurdish Opening and the Constitutional Reform: Is There any 
Progress?’, 9 European Yearbook of Minority Issues (2012) p. 643, at p. 651 et seq.; Latif Tas, 
‘The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System: Its Treatment of Kurds and a Discussion of Ter-
ritorial and non-Territorial Autonomy’, 21 International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights (2014) p. 497; Jan Erk, ‘Non-Territorial Millets in Ottoman History’, in Malloy and 
Palermo (eds.), supra note 45, p. 119.
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 citizenship or language, culture and traditions”, as well as non-territorially-
based structures endowed with legal personality.49
Other factors justify a reasonably fluid and cross-cutting legal articulation 
of Kurdish nationalist aspirations. While the democratic autonomy proposal 
does not need a “people” in a legal sense to function, the democratic autonomy 
concept most clearly rests on the participation of the Kurdish community in 
decision-making processes, especially those that are of direct concern to it. 
Graduated forms of political participation are very much part of the contem-
porary minority rights framework and must thus be taken seriously as models 
of accommodation in multinational or multicultural states.50 At the same 
time, the argument can work dynamically below and above the core idea of the 
Kurds as a national community. The Treaty of Lausanne, for example, despite 
its restriction of minority status to “non-Muslim” minorities, can and should be 
read to include the Kurds as “Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech” (under 
Article 39) for the purpose of protecting their language rights in a number of 
areas of public and private life (judicial process, commerce, religion, media, 
etc.).51 This field of standards becomes further amplified as we look at general 
human rights norms that, though by definition not specific to groups like the 
Kurds, can still generate group-related dimensions of protection.52 Such read-
ings effectively suggest the need for an open-textured legal positioning of the 
Kurds along a continuum that goes from a set of individual rights in distinctive 
circumstances to a robust institution of self-government – both of which are 
implied or openly pursued by the democratic autonomy proposal.
When contrasting the peoplehood or nationhood claim with the broader 
non-ethnocentric notion of democratic nation (and ultimately state) outlined 
in section 2, one can reasonably argue that, whatever the (understated) ten-
sion between the two ideas, the democratic autonomy proposal works more 
effectively, from a human rights perspective, when it flexibly relates the Kurds 
as a socio-cultural reality to various multi-layered, legal iterations of Kurdish 
claims and institutional goals, and how they can interact, and potentially 
 overlap, with other communal visions within Turkey (people of Turkey, Turks, 
49 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, The concept of “nation”, Recommendation 
1735 (2006), 7th Sitting, 26 January 2006, paras. 10, 12.
50 See supra note 45; osce Lund Recommendations, supra note 7; osce High Commissioner 
on National Minorities, The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies & 
Explanatory Note, November 2012, pp. 18–20, 45–51.
51 For a similar argument, see e.g. Oran, supra note 5, at pp. 43–44.
52 Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘Protecting Minority Groups through Human Rights Courts: The 
Interpretive Role of the European and Inter-American Jurisprudence’, in Ana Vrdoljak 
(ed.), The Cultural Dimension of Human Rights, eui Collected Courses (Oxford University 
Press,  Oxford, 2013) p. 73.
Downloaded from Brill.com08/20/2020 08:11:51AM
via free access
 185Assessing the Consistency of Kurdish Democratic
<UN>
nordic journal of international law 89(2020) 168-208
Kurds, other minorities, other minorities within Kurdish areas, etc.). This 
 dynamic positioning is effectively reinforced by the interplay of several inter-
national law principles and categories that, directly or indirectly, impact the 
Kurdish articulation of democratic autonomy. They include at least notions of 
territorial integrity, democracy and pluralism, as well as the broader concept of 
participation. I will next discuss each of them in turn, in order to explore the 
international legal background to the Kurdish argument (section 3.2), followed 
by an assessment of its implications for internal self-determination in Turkey 
(section 4).
3.2 Legal Categories behind Democratic Autonomy
There is hardly any articulation of group accommodation mechanisms in 
 international law that does not remind us of the principle of territorial integ-
rity that all such mechanisms must respect. This legal and policy mantra 
 permeates not only international instruments that openly refer to the right to 
self-determination, but also those texts that fail to do so.53
When coupled with the default position taken by the international commu-
nity against the breaking up of states, the logic of those international  standards 
is two-pronged: they rule out secessionist claims within the legal and policy 
framework they themselves provide; and, relatedly, they are very much an inte-
gral part of a wider consensus that views the unilateral pursuit of  secession (or 
independence) by sub-state groups as incompatible with the territorial stabil-
ity of states. In practice this signifies the lack of a freestanding unilateral right 
of sub-state groups to secession rather than a general prohibition of secession 
or independence under international law.54
Separate statehood might be achieved as a result of negotiations with the 
central authorities or otherwise a constitutional process (whether or not un-
der international scrutiny) that leads up to territorial changes in sovereignty 
backed by referenda.55 However unlikely it is for the central government to 
give a straightforward consent to such a process, the alternative possibilities of 
effecting secession on the ground through an extra-legal (typically or most 
53 See e.g. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1970 
(principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples); United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2007, Article 46(1); United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 
1992, Article 8(4); Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1995, 
Article 21.
54 See e.g. Crawford, supra note 31, p. 53.
55 On the increasing role of referenda in this context, see Markku Suksi, ‘The Referendum as 
an Instrument of Decision-Making in Autonomy-Related Situations’, in Hilpold (ed.), 
 supra note 5, p. 97.
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likely violent) process, possibly followed by some degree of recognition by 
states,56 or achieving so-called “remedial secession” in response to established 
patterns of oppression against the group,57 testify, at best, to the agnosticism of 
international law vis-à-vis independence, but do not add any greater weight to 
the problem in legal or policy terms. Remedial secession lacks widespread sup-
port amongst states, and any form of extra-constitutional resistance to central 
power would ordinarily be treated under international law as insurrectional in 
nature, with little or no room for enhancing the international legitimacy of the 
claim.58
In short, sub-state group aspirations are more likely to receive serious 
 consideration if they work within the structure of the state as they seek to ad-
vance their standing in conversation with the government and, possibly, other 
communities as well. Rather than dwelling on mechanisms of territorial redis-
tribution, it is far more common for international standards or human rights 
 practice relating to, or affecting, group accommodation to be framed in close 
conceptual and practical connection with ideas of democracy and pluralism.
For example, the signatories states of the csce 1990 Copenhagen Docu-
ment  on the Human Dimension (including Turkey) openly recognises that 
“the  questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily re-
solved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law”, includ-
ing,  crucially, respect for human rights, and political pluralism.59 Ten years 
later this approach is broadly reaffirmed by the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly in 2000; UN member states ex-
press their  resolve “to strengthen” their capacity “to implement the principles 
and  practices of democracy and respect for human rights, including minority 
56 See the Reference case, supra note 38, para. 142.
57 For discussion, see David Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Martinus 
 Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2002) ch. 7.
58 The Kosovo case, for example, does not support the remedial secession thesis: Accor-
dance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, 22 July 2010, icj, Advisory Opinion, para. 82, <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>, visited on 10 January 2019; see also James 
Summers, ‘The Internal and External Aspects of Self-Determination Reconsidered’, in 
Duncan French (ed.), Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Moder-
nity in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015) pp. 239–240. On 
the weakening of the international legitimacy of an unconstitutional attempt at seces-
sion, see e.g. the Reference case, supra note 38, para. 143; secessionist rebels are not enti-
tled to seek and receive support from third states: for a broader discussion about proce-
dural legitimacy, see Antonello Tancredi, ‘A Normative ‘due process’ in the Creation of 
States through Secession’, in Marcelo Kohen (ed.), Secession: International Law Perspec-
tives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) p. 171, at pp. 189–190.
59 Section iv, para. 30.
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rights”.60 More specific international human rights instruments, such as the 
United Nations declarations on minorities and indigenous peoples, respective-
ly, and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities, all work explicitly on the basis that the web of rights 
and entitlements that they provide can only operate within a democratic 
framework.61
While there is no definition of “democracy” per se under international law, 
and calls for a “right to democracy” have remained somehow elusive, both em-
pirically and conceptually,62 the link between democracy and pluralism has 
frequently come to the fore, especially under the European Convention on 
 Human Rights. In Gorzelik v. Poland, for instance, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights assertively notes that democracy “is the only political model 
 contemplated in the Convention and the only one compatible with it”, and 
emphasises the role of pluralism as a key internal feature of the concept of 
democracy. Premised on the need to ensure “the fair and proper treatment of 
minorities”, the Court’s view of democratic pluralism takes on political and cul-
tural dimensions, including recognition of entities “seeking an ethnic identity 
or asserting a minority consciousness”. Indeed, pluralism within a democratic 
system, the Court argues, “is also built on the genuine recognition of, and re-
spect for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural 
identities”.63
In this context international human rights law prohibits arbitrary limita-
tions by the state on the possibility of group recognition or self-identification 
and enables a group to make claims within acceptable limits, which are ordi-
narily defined by socio-historical evidence appropriate to the case, the deploy-
ment of non-violent methods of claim-making, and respect for the rights of 
60 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/2, 8 September 2000, Section v, para. 25.
61 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2007, eighteen pream-
bular para.; United Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 1992, sixth preambular para.; Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, fifth preambular para.
62 See e.g. Susan Marks and Andrew Clapham, International Human Rights Lexicon (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005) pp. 61–70. As is well-known, proponents of narrow views 
of democracy in international law as merely a matter of electoral rights and procedures, 
or otherwise an entitlement to non-discrimination within the political community, have 
generally refrained from taking internal group accommodation issues seriously. In this 
sense, the several international instruments referred to in this article suggest, if only im-
plicitly, a much more capacious view of a democratic framework.
63 European Court of Human Rights, Gorzelik v. Poland, Judgment, Application No. 
44158/9820, 17 February 2004, paras. 89–93.
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individuals within and outside of the group.64 Pluralism is arguably not a call 
for cultural relativism, but works within parameters that are meant to protect 
the democratic space itself, however loosely defined, across jurisdictions.65 
However, whereas political and cultural pluralism stands as a general marker 
of opposition to mono-cultural views of society, forms of legal pluralism (in 
the sense of distinct legal regimes solely linked to group membership) chal-
lenge conventional ideas of democracy that rest on unitary visions of the inter-
nal legal order.66 Claims to group-based legal pluralism thus tend to come 
 under closer scrutiny by human rights bodies,67 although global and regional 
trends under human rights law focus on the concrete operation of the regime 
(e.g. specific indigenous customary laws) and whether any internal reform that 
may be needed in particular contexts (e.g. specific faith-based personal laws) is 
being fostered by the state by encouraging an inclusive and participatory pro-
cess within the community.68
In fact, “participation” is a key legal facet to the robust democratic frame-
work assumed by most international standards in the field. The right to be 
 involved in decision-making processes of relevance to the group, and indeed in 
64 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Articles 33, 46; Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Article 3; ilo Convention 169 
on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, Article 1(2); United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment 23: The Rights of Minorities (Article 27) (UN Doc. ccpr/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.5), 8 April 1994; for discussion, see, for example, Patrick Macklem, ‘Indigenous Recog-
nition in International Law: Theoretical Observations’, 30 Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2008–09) p. 177; Joseph Marko (ed.), Human and Minority Rights Protection by 
Multiple Diversity Governance (Routledge, London, 2019) Section 9.2.1; Josef Marko, ‘The 
Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities and 
the Advisory Committee’s Thematic Commentary on Effective Participation’, in Weller 
(ed.), supra note 45, p. 222, at pp. 234, 242.
65 As noted, the European Court of Human Rights, for example, emphatically works on the 
basis that the European Convention protects pro-group political and cultural pluralism 
only to the extent that the latter does not conflict with the democratic values endorsed by 
the Convention.
66 For examples of this debate from a theoretical and/or legal perspective, see Payero-López 
and Nimni, supra note 41; Helen Quane, ‘Legal Pluralism and International Human Rights 
Law: Inherently Incompatible, Mutually Reinforcing or Something in Between?’, 33 Ox-
ford Journal of Legal Studies (2013) p. 675; Jonnette Watson Hamilton, ‘Acknowledging and 
Accommodating Legal Pluralism: An Application to the Draft Nordic Saami Convention’, 
in Nigel Bankes and Timo Koivurova (eds.), The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: Na-
tional and International Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights (Hart Publishing, Ox-
ford, 2013) p. 45; Ayelet Shachar, ‘Entangled: family, religion and human rights’, in Cindy 
Holder and David Reidy (eds.), Human Rights: The Hard Questions (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2013) p. 115.
67 See e.g. Pentassuglia, supra note 44, pp. 152–153.
68 See e.g. Quane, supra note 66, pp. 687–702.
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public life more broadly, is a constant feature of international (global and re-
gional) articulations of norms applicable to a variety of sub-state groups.69 
Participation rights can adapt to the area in which they operate (political, 
 socio-economic, cultural), although the gist of such rights in their multiple 
ramifications lies in an opportunity for an “effective” say in decision-making by 
the group representatives, or otherwise in real access of group members to a 
range of public policies.70
Under international law “effective participation” is not internally linked to a 
pre-defined set of institutional mechanisms or policies, as the requirement of 
“effectiveness” is often taken to be a legally mandatory result that allows for 
reasonable context-sensitive variations. However, general rights of participa-
tion, as stated in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, or general rights to freedom of association, and their attendant group-
related dimensions (e.g. pro-group political party formation, mother tongue 
availability of electoral materials, or genuine access to active and passive vot-
ing rights), all inform the notion of “effectiveness” as they come to represent 
some preliminary essentials of participation in the narrower sense of direct 
involvement in decision-making, beyond tokenistic forms of representation.71
The move from general (or generic) participation rights to more targeted 
mechanisms can be a difficult one to make, not least because of the significant 
process of cross-fertilisation that has taken place within global, regional and 
domestic human rights practice, and the consequent blurring of interpretative 
lines across legal regimes in judicial and non-judicial human rights discourse.72 
It is reasonable clear, though, that the minimum content that largely defines 
the general – arguably customary law – dimension of participation rights in 
this context need to be complemented by an adjustable suite of institutional 
69 See the osce Lund Recommendations, supra note 7; United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Articles 4, 18, 19, and 32(2); for a useful review of practice, 
see also Athanasios Yupsanis, ‘Article 27 of the iccpr Revisited – The Right to Culture as 
a Normative Source for Minority/Indigenous Participatory Claims in the Case Law of the 
Human Rights Committee’, 26 Hague Yearbook of International Law (2013) p. 359.
70 The Advisory Committee operating under the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities has openly referred to the right as entailing an “obligation of result” 
upon states: see Marko, supra note 64, p. 239.
71 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25: Article 25 (Participation 
in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) (UN Doc. ccpr/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7), 12 July 1996; Mar-
ko (ed.), supra note 64, Section 9.2; on the issue of using non-Turkish languages in elec-
toral campaigning in Turkey, see Kolcak, supra note 6, pp. 71–72.
72 For an example, see Pentassuglia, supra note 44, pp. 138–139; Marko (ed.), supra note 64, 
ch. 9.
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measures from which any credible judgment of the “effectiveness” of group 
participation (as a factual and legal result) would depend.
It is no coincidence that, over the course of a significant period of time, 
specialised mechanisms of participation have been identified on a fairly regu-
lar basis. Both the osce and the Council of Europe, for example, have openly 
endorsed (without mandating them) forms of proportional representation 
that can facilitate group representation (including reserved seats in Parlia-
ment or other public bodies, or exemptions from electoral thresholds), as well 
as, crucially, territorial and non-territorial forms of self-government.73 Al-
though such mechanisms aim to enhance effective participation within a 
democratic framework, international standards normally caution against a 
pervasive ethnification of institutional forms of group involvement.
They are broadly tolerant of political parties based on communal ties, for 
instance, as long as they are “the only hope for effective representation of 
 specific interests, and thus, for effective participation”.74 But in less divisive 
circumstances, there is a sense that the pro-group party will not identify exclu-
sively with the interest of the group and will not define party membership 
strictly in terms of ethnic or national affiliation.75 Similarly, any form of territo-
rial autonomy that is arranged within the state, while instrumentally designed 
to benefit a minority population that is in the majority within its traditional 
settlement area, is not construed against exclusivist ethno-national criteria but 
is rather viewed as an adjustable form of decentralisation of decision-making 
power within an institutional unit that democratically respects the rights of all 
individuals and groups within its jurisdiction.76 International support for cul-
tural (non-territorial) autonomy, on the other hand, outlines an alternative 
 jurisdictional space in pre-defined areas of significance to the group’s identity, 
73 Report of the csce Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, Geneva, 19 July 1991; 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Re-
port, February 1995, H(95)10, para. 80 (Article 15). Several cases of autonomy arrange-
ments are discussed, for example, in Hannum, supra note 27, Parts ii, iii; Yash Ghai and 
Sophia Woodman (eds.), Practising Self-Government: A Comparative Study of Autonomous 
Regions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013).
74 osce Lund Recommendations, supra note 7, Section B.8.
75 However, the Advisory Committee’s Thematic Commentary on Effective Participation in 
Public Affairs is clear that both mainstream parties and those formed by national minori-
ties can play a key role in facilitating participation, since minority involvement in main-
stream parties alone may not be sufficient: Commentary on The Effective Participation of 
Persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social and Economic Life and in Public 
Affairs, 27 February 2008, para. 78.
76 osce Lund Recommendations, supra note 7, Section iii.16.
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such as language and education.77 Yet it makes its success dependent upon the 
existence of a genuine participatory process, involving the central authorities 
and all sectors of the community, aiming to work out clear criteria around the 
legal status, competences and financing of the new autonomy bodies.78
It is important to note in the context of this analysis that the associative 
substance and decision-making inclusiveness of the principle of participation, 
though largely obtained within the jurisdiction of the state, can have impor-
tant transnational dimensions too. Article 2(5) of the 1992 United Nations Dec-
laration on Minorities recognises “free and peaceful” cross-border contact 
rights with kin-groups living in other states. Within this parameter, sub-state 
groups can seek to develop forms of transnational activism that result in either 
coordinating national organisations through supranational structures (e.g. the 
Sami Council in Nordic countries)79 or providing a measure of direct input 
into the work, including standard-setting exercises, of international bodies.80 
This sort of activity, no matter how influential it can be on the ground, particu-
larly at the level of participation in international decision-making,81 remains 
fundamentally within the ambit of private law-based organisations operating 
within and across state boundaries.82
Far more difficult, though, is the translation of such transnational activi-
ty  into a specific constitutionally-entrenched regulatory framework that can 
77 Malloy and Palermo (eds.), supra note 45.
78 See, for example, the Advisory Committee’s Thematic Commentary, supra note 75, paras. 
135–136; for a broader comparative assessment and, in particular, the need to secure group 
involvement and proper accountability within the group, see Federica Prina, David J. 
Smith and Judit Molnar Sansum, ‘National Cultural Autonomy in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Challenges and Possibilities’, in Nimni and Aktoprak (eds.), supra note 9, p. 85.
79 Timo Koivurova, ‘Can Saami Transnational Indigenous Peoples Exercise Their Self- 
Determination in a World of Sovereign States?’, in Bankes and Koivurova (eds.), supra 
note 66, p. 105.
80 See e.g. Article 17(2) of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities.
81 For the work of the Sami Council as a representative of voluntary Sami associations from 
Finland, Russia, Norway and Sweden, see the official website at <http://www.saamicoun-
cil.net>, visited on 13 January 2020.
82 This does not rule out the possibility of the relevant entities being endowed with specific 
public tasks or powers by the state: in the context of cultural (non-territorial) autonomy, 
see Markku Suski, ‘Non-Territorial Autonomy: The Meaning of ‘(Non-)Territoriality’, in 
Malloy and Palermo (eds.), supra note 45, p. 83, at pp. 92–93, 101–103. Interestingly, Suski 
reviews models of cultural autonomy in Estonia, Finland and Serbia and remarks more 
broadly: “[w]hat is striking in relation to the principles of self-determination and sover-
eignty of the state is that the non-territorial autonomies organized as cultural autonomies 
have several degrees of freedom as concerns cross-border and international activities in 
comparison with regular territorial autonomy” (p. 114).
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 enable its simultaneous and permanent institutionalisation within state juris-
dictions. Examples of this kind are few and far between. The 2005 Draft Nordic 
Saami Convention, produced by Norway, Finland and Sweden together with 
their respective Saami parliaments, represents one such example in that it pro-
vides a hybrid model of joint governance of communal practices (including a 
blend of territorial and cultural autonomy) and state laws within an overarch-
ing treaty framework.83 Some form of cross-border regulative dimension based 
on a choice and recognition of group belonging was put forward by the Bad-
inter Commission as one possible implication of self-determination across 
state boundaries in the post-Yugoslav space, and was partly endorsed by the 
Dayton Agreement that ended the war in the former Yugoslavia.84 However, 
these (tentative) examples indicate that, if anything, any sustained and sys-
tematic cross-border framework is ordinarily a function of advanced regional 
intergovernmental cooperation and/or some form of regulated kin-state in-
volvement rather than group self-management per se.
Whatever graduated levels of pluralism and participation are enjoyed by 
sub-state national groups, they should not be seen as stepping-stones towards 
some inflexible end state defined by the group – be it independent sovereignty 
or a unique (non-negotiable) idea of self-government that overwhelmingly pri-
orities separation over social cohesion. The osce Ljubljana Guidelines on In-
tegration of Diverse Societies aptly remind us that:
[I]t is essential for societies to find the appropriate balance between the 
degree of separation that is necessary to the free expression and develop-
ment of diversity on the one hand and the establishment and strengthen-
ing of links between and among the diverse communities of a society as 
a whole on the other.85
Importantly, they go on to envisage a comprehensive process whereby majori-
ties and minorities engage with one another “through negotiation and mutual 
accommodation”:
Such negotiations should be conducted within institutional and proce-
dural frameworks that enable effective participation and fair decision-
making. In addition to offering a greater chance of successful outcomes, 
83 See Hamilton, supra note 66.
84 For commentary, see Bell, supra note 45, pp. 225–226; for a degree of institutional cross-
border exchanges under the 1998 Good Friday Agreement concerning Northern Ireland, 
see ibid., p. 115.
85 The Ljubljana Guidelines supra note 50, Section ii.7.
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the simple act of engaging in genuine negotiation can enhance participa-
tion by all groups in society.86
These statements are in keeping with the opportunities and constraints of the 
international law framework. From the internal perspective of sub-state na-
tionalist aspirations, they arguably intimate what Neil Walker has referred to as 
“reflexive nationalism”, meaning an approach to claims that is based on con-
tinuing efforts by the group to negotiate the terms of their accommodation 
rather than the teleological pursuit of a pre-defined modality of recognition, 
particularly in relation to specific ideas of self-government.87
This proceduralist view of diversity management ties up, directly or indirect-
ly, with evolving contemporary accounts of self-determination that, prompt ed 
primarily by constitutional court pronouncements,88 emphasise the dialogic 
institutional process of giving some form of recognition to well- supported sub-
state national claims, under conditions to which most, if not all, of the above 
human rights standards contribute to varying degrees.89 Such a comprehensive, 
relational process requires serious consideration of, at least, the group's ability 
to effectively articulate its claim – i.e., to have a proper say in that process – the 
justifications for particular institutional mechanisms of accommodation like 
self-government, as well as operational issues associated with the claim, includ-
ing respect for the rights of others.90
With this in mind, the following section goes back to the components of the 
democratic autonomy proposal put forward by the Kurdish movement in or-
der to examine, not Turkey’s human rights obligations per se, but rather the 
86 Ibid., Section ii.8.
87 Walker, supra note 13, p. 163.
88 The Reference case, supra note 38; Xabier Arzoz and Markku Suksi, ‘Comparing Constitu-
tional Adjudication of Self-Determination Claims’, 25 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law (2018) p. 452; Walker, supra note 13. But see also, arguably implicitly, Le-
gal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, 
25  February 2019, iCJ, Advisory Opinion, para. 144, <<https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/169/169-20190225-01-00-EN.pdf>, visited on 15 February 2020.
89 For some earlier articulations of similar views from an international law perspective 
(post-Reference case), see Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Re-
lational Approach’, in Pekka Aikio and Martin Scheinin (eds.), Operationalising The Right 
of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (Institute for Human Rights/Åbo Akademi 
University, Turku/Åbo, 2000) p. 19; Jan Klabbers, ‘The Right to Be Taken Seriously: Self-
Determination in International Law’, 28 Human Rights Quarterly (2006) p. 186; Bell, supra 
note 45, chs. 5, 11.
90 For reflections on this process, see Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘Self-Determination, Human 
Rights, and the Nation-State: Revisiting Group Claims through a Complex Nexus in Inter-
national Law’, 19 International Community Law Review (2017) p. 443, at p. 471 et seq.
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close interface of the democratic autonomy concept with that view of self- 
determination as a significant trend in international human rights law.
4 Democratic Autonomy as Internal Self-determination in Turkey
4.1 What Trans-border Autonomy?
I have already noted that whatever secessionist ambitions existed in the early 
days of the Kurdish movement led by the pkk (largely echoing the anti- colonial 
struggle at the time in Africa and Asia),91 the democratic autonomy proposal 
does not rest on a – present or future – claim to independence for Kurdistan or 
southeast Anatolia in Turkey. As a self-determination aspiration, this is essen-
tially a claim to internal reform, with a cross-border dimension.92
In this sense, the development of a federal or confederal structure across 
Kurdistan that is entailed by the idea of “democratic confederalism” not only 
works across existing state boundaries, but represents an attempt to amplify, in 
terms of institutional voice and leverage, a series of internal self-determination 
claims built around the concept of democratic autonomy.93
While ruling out secession or independence taps into international law’s 
ultimate hostility towards the undermining of states’ territorial integrity (i.e. 
aside from operational challenges), it is unclear the extent to which interna-
tional law can work towards supporting the cross-border dimension that is at 
the heart of democratic confederalism. As indicated in the previous section, 
elements of transnationalism in articulating forms of group accommodation 
are (or can be) embedded in international human rights standards or ad hoc 
regulatory frameworks, so much so that group participation in international 
91 Cengiz Gunes and Welat Zeydalioğlu note that the Kurdish question became increasingly 
articulated as a case of colonialism in the late 1960s: ‘Introduction: Turkey and the Kurds’, 
in Gunes and Zeydalioğlu (eds.), supra note 2, p. 3.
92 The idea that the Kurds in Turkey might claim a right to “remedial secession” in light of 
the oppression they face remains legally untested and is definitely beyond the parameters 
of the democratic autonomy proposal. However, as noted earlier, even latest develop-
ments do not support the remedial secession theory in international law: see supra 58. For 
a recent view that nevertheless briefly alludes to, without discussing, this possibility, see 
Gudmundur Alfredsson, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law’, in Akbu-
lut and Aktoprak (eds.), supra note 8, p. 28.
93 In the Preface to the ‘Contract’ approved by the Union of Kurdistan Communities’ in 2005 
(see supra note 16) Ocalan’s idea of self-determination is essentially equated to “non-state 
self-government”, which in turn makes “democratic confederalism” essentially the exter-
nal projection of self-government arrangements within each of the relevant Middle East-
ern states.
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activities of relevance to them has been incorporated in individual models of 
non-territorial autonomy94 and could be seen as an external feature of self-
determination accommodation within the state.95
One may question, though, whether democratic confederalism per se could 
go beyond a complex web of private law-based arrangements across the Kurd-
istan region that, provided its internal conformity with human rights  standards, 
offers a useful (“free and peaceful”) platform for cross-border networking, 
management and advocacy. This would essentially expand on existing mecha-
nisms as outline above, and would arguably enrich the level of economic and 
educational exchanges that are already in place in the Kurdistan region (par-
ticularly between Turkey and northern Iraq).96 However, when we move from 
the grass-root level or private sphere of activity to the institutionalisation of a 
cross-border self-government structure in the public sphere, the lack of any 
serious prospect of advanced regional intergovernmental cooperation in part-
nership with the Kurdish communities (through a treaty framework or other-
wise), and the obvious lack of a kin-state, render democratic confederalism as 
a constitutional (formally entrenched) device across borders unrealistic.
4.2 Rethinking Pluralism and Participation
If democratic autonomy in practice falls back on the need for a state frame-
work within which the accommodation of Kurdish aspirations must be 
achieved, then its close conceptual link with the sort of societal pluralism 
 required by contemporary understandings of internal self-determination rep-
resents the most obvious baseline from which to assess its internal consistency 
with international law.
In this respect the broad notion of democratic nation (internal and external 
to Kurdish communities) on which the idea of democratic autonomy rests, 
whatever legal qualifications may attract from a human rights standpoint, 
 undoubtedly reflects the element of self-identification as a key source for es-
tablishing the existence of a community as a socio-cultural, or indeed  “national” 
reality under customary international law, regardless of state classifications. 
Virtually all pro-Kurdish political parties, especially the most recent represen-
tative of them in Turkey, the hdp, have advocated a solution to the Kurdish 
question on the basis of a revised pluralistic constitution that recognises an 
94 See Suksi, supra note 82.
95 See e.g. Leena Heinämäki, ‘The Nordic Saami Convention: The Right of a People to Con-
trol Issues of Importance to Them’, in Bankes and Koivurova (eds.), supra note 66, pp. 
141–145.
96 Klein, supra note 2, p. 51.
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inclusive notion of citizenship and national identity that is capable of recog-
nising and accommodating different group identities within the boundaries of 
the state.97
When we compare the hybrid blend of civic and ethnic dimensions of Kurd-
ish nationalism with the ambivalence of international law and national adju-
dicators vis-à-vis sub-state cultural nationalism in the context of claims to self-
determination of “peoples” (as discussed in section 3.1), it is probably safe to 
argue that, in the Turkish context, advocating a more plural “self” across soci-
ety is far more of an institutional urgency than seeking a distinct recognition 
of the Kurds as the locus of a wholly separate self-determination unit. In other 
words, an international (self-determination) legal challenge to the culturally 
monolithic view of the state implied by Article 3 of the Constitution of Turkey, 
and repeatedly supported by the Constitutional Court,98 has less to do with the 
group’s precise international legal status and more to do with opening up a 
constitutional space for the democratic autonomy proposal to be given serious 
consideration and recognition. Aside from Turkey’s obvious multiple responsi-
bilities, not least the legal obligation to de-securitise the Kurdish question as 
required by several judgments of the European Court of Human Rights on po-
litical party closures,99 this ultimately involves a measure of dynamic self-def-
inition and self-recognition by the Kurdish movement itself.100
Against the backdrop of self-determination/participation standards,101 dem-
ocratic autonomy is squarely built around bottom-up control over decision-
making rather than voting rights per se. “Effective” participation is measured 
97 The hdp seeks “the realisation of the constitutional assurance of equality of rights of dif-
ferent identities, languages, beliefs and cultures” (see supra note 12).
98 Oran, supra note 5, pp. 47–49; Bayir, supra note 23, ch. 5; Emre Turkut and Ikboljon 
Qoraboyev, ‘International Law in the Turkish Legal Order: Transnational Judicial Dialogue 
and the Turkish Constitutional Court’, 26 Italian Yearbook of International Law (2017) p. 41.
99 Turkut and Qoraboyev, supra note 98, Section 4.2; Olgun Akbulut, ‘A Critical Analysis of 
Current Legal Developments on the Political Participation of Minorities in Turkey’, 17 In-
ternational Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2010) p. 551; Marko (ed.), supra note 64, 
Section 9.2.1.
100 As perceptively noted by Neil Walker on the back of current self-determination practice, 
the recognition of sub-state group aspirations as part of constitutional conversations 
“works, first and foremost, as an internal feature of the increasingly reflexive character of 
national political movements and projects – a form of self-recognition” (supra note 13, 
p. 173). In this sense, the engagement of the Kurdish movement in any future negotiation 
with the government of Turkey is likely to generate a dynamic self-assessment of the 
movement itself and what it seeks to achieve.
101 The notion of representative government, or equal access to government, is a starting 
point for any minimal form of group recognition: see the 1970 UN Declaration on Friendly 
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against the actual depth of a democratic process that extends “from the local 
village and city communes, to the city councils, and to the municipalities and 
up to the people’s congress”.102 This vision of a “dynamic political life” is not im-
mediately linked to active and passive electoral rights on a regional or national 
levels as it defines “participation” essentially as a form of self-management that 
is free from state (“undemocratic”) interference.103 Such a model of “non-state” 
participation – some kind of self-determination exclusively internal to Kurdish 
society – discursively reinforces the call for a  genuinely pluralistic space that 
works towards politically empowering the Kurds in Turkey and elsewhere, but 
does not, and cannot, legally do away with the broader state framework in 
which democratic autonomy needs to be addressed.
On the one hand, as the case of Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey clearly illus-
trates, and as the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion has recently confirmed,104 the exceptionally high threshold to gain parlia-
mentary representation in Turkey has historically impacted the ability of 
 pro-Kurdish parties (and minority groups more generally) to be represented in 
government and to actually influence decision-making, despite a significant 
level of (Kurdish) popular support at the regional level.105 Coupled with key 
Relations, supra note 53; and more broadly Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peo-
ples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995) p. 101 et seq.
102 Abdullah Öcalan, Bir Halki Savunmak (Weşanên Serxwebûn, 2004, as translated by Gunes, 
supra note 8, p. 252).
103 On this view, democracy/participation, and consequently democratic self-government as 
a form of self-determination, is conceptually decoupled from the “state” or statehood. See 
e.g. Bezwan, supra note 9, p. 69; Öcalan, supra note 9, p. 469. And to the extent that the 
primary (political) focus is not on general voting rights, it reflects the core idea of democ-
racy as popular control (supra section 2, note 7) but somehow mirrors debates over 
narrow(er) or broad(er) views of democracy from a general international law perspective 
(see supra note 62).
104 European Court of Human Rights, Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, Judgment, Application No. 
10226/03, 8 July 2008; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion, Concluding observations on the combined fourth to sixth periodic reports of Turkey 
(cerd/C/tur/CO/4–6), 11 January 2016.
105 The Racial Discrimination Committee has expressed its concern that “the 10 per cent 
threshold constitutes an obstacle to the equitable representation of minority groups in 
political affairs, in particular in elected bodies (arts. 2 and 5)” (supra note 104, para. 31) and 
recommended that “the State party improve the representation of ethnic groups in public 
and private life, including revising the 10 per cent threshold target for political parties” 
(ibid., para. 32). In the Yumak and Sadak case (supra note 104), the European Court con-
ceded that the 10 per cent threshold appeared “excessive” and recommended (in line with 
numerous Council of Europe texts) that it be lowered, but controversially concluded that 
it was not in breach of Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the Convention; a solid dissent argued that 
the Turkish voting system was incompatible with the accommodation of the interests of 
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operational aspects of the electoral process, such as the circulation of electoral 
materials in non-Turkish languages, one can hardly doubt about the close link 
between effective participation and general participation rights, including 
general voting rights, as set out, for example, in Article 25 of the iccpr.106 At 
the same time, we need to distinguish the bottom-up approach to democratic 
autonomy as a way of creating an associative platform for dealing with a vari-
ety of societal concerns internal to the Kurdish-populated areas in Turkey, 
 including representatives of other minority groups,107 from the institutional 
 entrenchment of democratic autonomy as one variant or another of self- 
government.108 When applied to the broader state framework, the first line of 
thinking attracts, again, associative freedoms and basic participation rights in 
decision-making within a minimally democratic system. It essentially breaks 
down into a series of societal arrangements governed by private law that, if ap-
plied properly, is fully consistent with human rights standards, including forms 
of internal pluralism.109 The second, institutionally ambitious paradigm of 
democratic autonomy as territorial and/or cultural autonomy as outlined in 
the previous sections, namely one that involves a measure of decentralisation 
of decision-making authority under public law or with a public law dimension, 
calls instead for more complex considerations regarding the justifications and 
operationalisation of self-government as part of a constitutionally deeper, 
state-wide self-determination process.
a large part of the electorate that identifies with a national or other minority, and thus 
exceeded the state’s margin of appreciation (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, 
Vajić, Jaeger, and Šikuta, para. 5).
106 In the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 25 (see supra note 71, para. 12), it is 
noted, for instance, that “[i]nformation and materials about voting should be available in 
minority languages”; the use of the Kurdish language and its dialects in Turkey’s electoral 
campaigning was one of the language issues addressed by the so-called “Democratisation 
Package” adopted by the government in 2014: Kolcak, supra note 6, pp. 71–72; see also the 
1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Article 39(4) (prohibiting language restrictions on Turkish na-
tionals at, inter alia, “public meetings”).
107 An important example of this model of participation is the broad civil society network 
operating within the framework of the Diyarbakir-based Democratic Society Congress: 
see Gunes, supra note 8, pp. 261–262.
108 It is worth noting here the suggestion that the rights of participation in Article 25 of the 
iccpr can themselves include forms of “local, regional or cultural autonomy” in order to 
make the participation of certain groups in decision-making effective (United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, Comm. 760/1997 (UN Doc. ccpr/
C/76/D/760/1997 (2000), 69th sess.), 25 July 2000, Separate opinion by Mr Martin 
Scheinin).
109 Suski, supra note 24. On internal pluralism linked to freedom of association or mecha-
nisms of consultation/participation, or otherwise the wider international human rights 
law framework, see Marko, supra note 64; Quane, supra note 66, pp. 687–702.
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4.3 Justifying Democratic Autonomy
In terms of justifications, the historical legacy of Kurdish self-administration 
within the Ottoman Empire arguably represents an important strand of 
 current autonomy claims. As clearly shown by a number of historical studies, 
beginning in the early 16th century, and regardless of the millet system,  Kurdish 
autonomy was established under the Ottomans in at least three Kurdish- 
populated provinces (eyalets) with, respectively, Diyarbakir, Raqqa and Mosul 
as their administrative centres. The level of autonomy varied depending on the 
administrative status of the specific entity, although all of them were eventu-
ally abolished as a result of the pervasive centralising process of “Turkification” 
fostered by the late Ottoman elites in the tanzimat era (1838–1876) and 
 reinforced by the emerging Turkish nationalist movement of the early 20th 
century.110
As noted, the short-lived Turkey’s (Kemalist) Constitution of 1921 was 
 adopted one year after the Treaty of Sèvres, which, in line with US President 
Wilson’s idea of autonomy of non-Turkish minorities within the Ottoman 
 Empire, had included a clear legal commitment to a “scheme of local autono-
my” for the Kurds.111 While the Kemalists behind the 1921 Constitution had re-
jected the Sèvres reconfiguration of post-Ottoman territories, the 1921 Consti-
tution was not in itself hostile to (Kurdish) autonomy arrangements either, as 
illustrated by the driving factor behind Article 11, and as additionally (though 
indirectly) confirmed by the autonomous status granted to the Greek Islands 
of Imbros and Tenedos under the Treaty of Lausanne, signed by Turkey two 
years later and implemented by legislation in 1927.112 Also, some form of very 
sporadic self-critical assessment of the historical record by sectors of the Turk-
ish political world in more recent decades, however insufficient to solve the 
Kurdish question, indicates a certain level of awareness of the connection 
 between past repression and current Kurdish demands.113
The democratic autonomy proposal is effectively a way of crossing the 
bridge between the past and the present by de facto revitalising and ultimately 
reconceptualising previous international and domestic regulatory frameworks 
110 Van Bruinessen, supra note 26, p. 157 ff.; Veli Yadirgi, The Political Economy of the Kurds of 
Turkey: from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2017) p. 72 et seq.
111 See supra notes 29, 32, 33. The same approach to local autonomy was subsequently con-
firmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1925 in relation to the so-called Mosul 
question, i.e., the question of the Turkish-Iraqi border: see Bring, supra note 5, p. 162.
112 For an assessment of that (still legally valid) experience, see Akbulut, supra note 29.
113 Kolcak, supra note 6, pp. 68–69 (including criticism of the official policy of assimilation 
and a short-lived call for change in the early 1990s and 2000s).
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and models of accommodation. The Treaty of Lausanne unquestionably repre-
sented the point of legal rupture with the Ottoman past that has since been 
carried over to the subsequent articulations of the Turkish legal order.  Although 
no legal obligation regarding autonomy can be construed as a matter of state 
succession, treaty interpretation, let alone inter-temporal law, it can still be 
argued that democratic autonomy is consistent with international law (and 
the international law of self-determination in particular) in the sense that Lau-
sanne does not in itself prohibit autonomy solutions (just as it does not pro-
hibit an extension of the minority concept as a matter of international and 
Turkish law).114 In other words, from an international law perspective, the 
 historical record of Kurdish autonomy (achieved or proposed) provides impor-
tant (material) evidence of both the distinctiveness of Kurdish communal ex-
istence and the legitimacy and consistency of the current claim to autonomy.
This is even more so if democratic autonomy – understood as a series 
of graduated forms of accommodation involving Kurdish identity and a de-
gree of decision-making authority, rather than a single, tightly construed idea 
of   self-government – can be said to engage the international law of self- 
determination directly and more ambitiously, at least on two levels. For one 
thing, in  circumstances of sustained conflict like the present one, it is rea-
sonable to believe that some degree of autonomy is the best way, probably 
the only way, of implementing existing interlocking norms on internal self-
determination that  benefit the Kurds and the country as a whole.115 The un-
disputed lack of a freestanding general right to autonomy under international 
law does not detract from the recurrent use of autonomy in its various forms 
as a tool for fulfilling the sort of internal self-determination arrangements 
114 The Racial Discrimination Committee has noted that “the Treaty of Lausanne does not 
explicitly prohibit the recognition of other groups as minorities. The Committee there-
fore recommends that the State party review its position and consider recognizing other 
groups that may qualify as being ethnic, national or ethno-religious minorities, such as 
Kurds, Roma, Ezidis and Caferis” (supra note 104, para. 14). In a broadly similar vein, the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed its concern about “the discrimina-
tion and the restrictions suffered by members of minorities, such as the Kurds and the 
Roma, affecting their right to enjoy their own culture and use their own language (arts. 2 
and 27)”, United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the initial 
report of Turkey adopted by the Committee at its 106th session (15 October – 2 November 2012) 
(ccpr/C/tur/CO/1), 13 November 2012, para. 9.
115 Marc Weller has spoken of a “strong presumption” in favour of autonomy in such circum-
stances (Towards A General Comment on Self-Determination and Autonomy (UN Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/WP.5), 25 May 2005, pp. 13–16); and Christine Bell, supra note 84, 
p. 225, has similarly argued that autonomy arrangements as part of what she calls hybrid 
self-determination can be “the best application of the law in situations of intrastate eth-
nic conflict”.
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 referred to in the Reference case – indigenous autonomy being only one in-
stance of such practice.116
More broadly, democratic autonomy goes a long way towards correcting in-
justices caused by the abandonment of the 1920 Sèvres arrangements by the 
international community and the domestic reshaping of the Kurdish question 
as a matter of forced assimilation, state-sponsored violence, and ultimately 
unequal access to government in the aftermath of the Treaty of Lausanne. 
While this background may or may not militate in favour of transforming Tur-
key into a specific binational state, it certainly shows the extent to which these 
treaty settlements implicate international law in distributing sovereign au-
thority in post-Ottoman territories, and the continuing effects of such reshap-
ing of the Kurdish question over the last century.117
Finally, the democratic autonomy proposal is the reflection of a resilient 
and long-standing articulation of Kurdish autonomy demands in Turkey’s pub-
lic discourse, despite the lack of region-wide referenda in Kurdish-populated 
areas. Whatever variations may exist in the way democratic autonomy is un-
derstood within the Kurdish movement, its overwhelming support for solu-
tions that are built around the recognition of Kurdish identity and decentrali-
sation of power that can benefit the Kurdish community is well-established.118 
This clearly expressed view should be given serious consideration and some 
form of recognition as part of a comprehensive and relational internal 
 self-determination process in the sense indicated above, namely a process of 
116 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 4; in addition to 
the analyses offered in the preceding note, see the wide range of practical examples of 
autonomy arrangements, supra note 73.
117 The point here is informed by both distributive justice dimensions (for a broader argu-
ment, see, for example, Patrick Macklem, The Sovereignty of Human Rights (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 2015), chs. 5, 7) and the notion that Lausanne can and should be in-
terpreted, not in isolation from contemporary human rights standards, but in light of the 
evolving norm of internal self-determination (e.g. Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, Article 31(3)(c)). In other words, the 1923 Lausanne regime should no longer be seen 
as a valid platform for legally insulating the Kurdish question (if it ever was possible to see 
it in that way back then) and de facto enabling anti-Kurdish repressive policies (see also 
supra note 114); on the contrary, democratic autonomy can be regarded as a way of rem-
edying the effects of those continuing (current) unequal policies by achieving a measure 
of internal self-determination as increasingly recognised under international human 
rights law.
118 Virtually all sectors of the Kurdish movement in its multiple and diverse articulations 
have repeatedly called for such solutions since the establishment of modern Turkey. In 
Turkey’s latest general election (June 2018), the hdp managed for the second time to pass 
the 10 per cent threshold on a similar political platform, as far as the Kurdish question was 
concerned.
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negotiation that is triggered by established national group demands (in line 
with the Reference case)119 and pursues the effective involvement of the group 
and the wider objective of mutual accommodation.120
4.4 Implementing Self-government
In operational terms, the self-government model embraced by the democratic 
autonomy proposal is reinforced not only by the actual practice of associa-
tive  (personal) autonomy fostered by leading Kurdish civil society organisa-
tions,  but also by the special significance attached by pro-Kurdish political 
 parties in Turkey to the Council of Europe’s 1985 European Charter of Local 
Self- Government (ecls, to which Turkey is a party). Based on ideas of decen-
tralisation of power from the centre to the local level, the treaty embraces a 
broad notion of territorial administration:
Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authori-
ties, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial 
share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests 
of the local population.121
In more recent years such a broad notion has been adopted as a template for 
challenging the overly centralist structure of the state and as a contribution to 
its democratisation consistent with the principle of subsidiarity in the Euro-
pean space.122 However, while all sectors of the Kurdish movement – from the 
pkk to the hdp – strongly endorse power decentralisation and do so in ways 
119 The Reference case, supra note 38 (the Court insisted at several junctures on the need for 
Quebec’s claim to be backed by a “clear majority” of Quebecers; while the claim in this 
case was one of secession, the democratic and legitimacy-related logic of the Court’s 
point arguably applies by analogy to autonomy claims within the state).
120 See supra, Section 3.2.
121 ets No.122, 1985, Article 3(1). It entered into force in Turkey on 1 April, 1993.
122 Article 4(3) states that: “Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, 
by those authorities which are closest to the citizen”. The Council of Europe has drawn 
upon this principle through later resolutions involving national minorities: for a review, 
see for example, Bill Bowring, ‘Enhanced Local Self-government as a Means of Enhancing 
Minority Governance’, in Weller (ed.), supra note 45, pp. 671–672. The principle of subsid-
iarity made its appearance within the European Union framework under the 1997 Euro-
pean Union’s Amsterdam Treaty and was then reinforced under the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon. 
It has been noted that the mechanism as it stands, by recognising sub-state cultural and 
linguistic identities and enhancing the role of sub-state and regional parliaments in the 
Union’s decision-making, can “provide an institutional answer for greater autonomy of 
sub-state political entities in the EU” (Jacint Jordana, Adam Halesch, Michael Keating, 
Axel Marx and Jan Wouters, ‘Self-determination and the reconfiguration of the nation-
state in Europe’, in Keating et al. (eds.), supra note 13, p. 259).
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that highlight the enhanced participatory standing of any future territorial 
self-government unit, the hdp’s and its immediate predecessors’ flexible use of 
the democratic autonomy proposal in the context of a general regionalisation 
of the country somehow distinguishes itself from the more structured and spe-
cific localism across Kurdish areas articulated by the pkk – from villages and 
neighbourhoods to higher levels of administration.
From a self-determination perspective, the operational form of self- 
government is inevitably a function of the “specific historical and territorial 
circumstances” of the country,123 and there is in principle no international 
 legal  impediment to forms of sub-regional autonomy being seen as part of any 
 future structure of self-government. While most relevant international stan-
dards explicitly or implicitly allow for solutions across all levels of sub-state 
government, and the ecls itself is not prescriptive about the particular tier of 
“local authority” to which regulatory and management responsibilities are to 
be assigned,124 there is generally a sense that self-government arrangements 
relating to group accommodation are primarily concerned with regional au-
tonomy rather than self-government at municipal or village level.125 The 1992 
UN Declaration on minorities, for example, explicitly links up the right to 
 effective participation in decision-making with the “regional level” concerning 
the group or the “regions” where the group’s members live (Article 2(3)). It is 
arguably far more common in self-determination peace settlement practice or 
broader national practice for forms of municipal self-administration to be 
linked, by way of exception, to the specific ethnic demographics of the munici-
pality or municipalities in question (somehow echoing the hybrid status of 
towns and cities from post-war period settlements),126 or otherwise to locally 
tailored competences of cultural self-government (close to, yet institutionally 
separate from the broader municipal level of authority),127 or unfortunately to 
be side-lined entirely as a result of top-down (centrally controlled) processes 
of regionalisation.128
123 csce Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension, 1990, para. 35.
124 Article 4(3)(5), for example, implies that powers can be delegated to sub-regional authori-
ties as well.
125 By commenting on the Lund Recommendations (supra note 7), Bill Bowring notes that 
“self-governance” in this context is mainly understood in terms of regional arrangements 
(Bowring, supra note 124, p. 669).
126 For examples, see Weller, supra note 115, p. 7.
127 Suksi, supra note 82; see also Athanasios Yupsanis, ‘Minority Cultural Autonomy in Slove-
nia, Croatia and Serbia: A Real Opportunity for Cultural Survival or a Right Void of Sub-
stance?’, 12 Europäisches Journal für Minderheitenfragen (2019) p. 83.
128 On the impact of Russia’s implementation of the European Charter of Local Self- 
Government on national minorities, see Bowring, supra note 124, p. 678.
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In short, the territorial dimension of the democratic autonomy pro-
posal does require a careful balance between a purely jurisdictional, group 
 identity-blind redistribution of decision-making authority across the country 
and a highly localistic (and potentially vertically centralist) administrative pat-
tern exclusive to Kurdish areas.129 At the same time, the element of account-
ability to and direct participation of the local population, both of which are 
at the heart of democratic autonomy, must be taken seriously as graduated 
forms of internal self-determination. In this respect, the additional element 
of cultural (non-territorial) autonomy to the democratic autonomy proposal – 
which is designed to accommodate all Kurdish sectors of society (and possibly 
other groups) regardless of their settlement area – appeals precisely to this 
drive for grass-root democracy and involvement, at least in matters of vital 
interest to Kurdish identity. One may question whether cultural autonomy, 
whatever its current empirical record,130 can achieve “stateless democracy” 
(state-free interference),131 but it is most certainly the case that territorial and/
or non-territorial arrangements are fully consistent with (indeed, required by) 
the  international law of self-determination as long as they both operationalise 
effective participation rights and are thus both made part of sustained consti-
tutional conversations over the concrete form of recognition the democratic 
 autonomy proposal should be given in Turkey.
This dynamic interaction between structural changes affecting the country 
as a whole and crafting a solution specific to the Kurds in Turkey can re-emerge 
on a smaller scale in the context of debates over the extent to which the demo-
cratic autonomy proposal can be reconciled with the rights of others as part of 
a genuinely pluralistic and relational process of internal self-determination. As 
discussed in section 2, to the extent that democratic autonomy seeks to achieve 
territorial self-government, it is a proposal that instrumentally benefits Kurd-
ish majority areas through the reallocation of competences from the centre as 
a result of a negotiated and delimited decentralisation of power (delegation/
devolution, etc.), not a claim to an ethno-centric model of accommodation. 
This is entirely consistent with the international conceptualisation of territo-
rial autonomy. As hinted at above, the 1999 osce Lund Recommendations, for 
example, are clear that, whatever the form of self-governance arrangements, 
129 It is not unreasonable to assume that a tight link of lower to higher layers of (self-)govern-
ment could in practice favour a robust centralisation of power over the diverse concerns 
of local communities.
130 Its current record is quite a mixed one: see Prina et al., supra note 78; Yupsanis, supra note 
129; see also Alexander Osipov, ‘Autonomy as Symbolic Production: The Case of Contem-
porary Russia’, in Malloy and Palermo (eds.), supra note 45, p. 179.
131 Gunes, supra note 8, p. 258.
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“in no case is this to include an ethnic criterion for territorial arrangements”,132 
and that the self-government unit must operate on the basis of democratic 
principles to ensure that it “genuinely reflects the views of the affected popula-
tion”, including any minorities within.133 More broadly, democratic autonomy 
conceptually works on the basis that it must either respect the rights of all 
 inhabitants of Kurdish-majority areas (territorial administration) or otherwise 
constitute a model of accommodation that can, where appropriate, be repli-
cated across the entire spectrum of minority groups in order to entrench plu-
ralism and group diversity throughout the state (cultural autonomy/broad 
group recognition).134
This is again in line with the expectations of a serious self-determination 
process that accounts for the individuals and groups affected within and out-
side of the wider political community concerned, but also one that is capable 
of negotiating distinctive jurisdictional spaces that govern the relationship 
 between the state and the group. Just as the Reference case appeals to the inter-
play of federalism, democracy, the rule of law and the protection of minorities 
to articulate the complex web of institutional and social relationships underly-
ing the domestic and international law position of Quebec within Canada,135 
so too has the European Court of Human Rights (and other human rights 
 bodies) openly embraced a notion of militant democracy that protects claims 
to robust forms of sub-state group accommodation as long as they themselves 
are compatible with democracy, particularly by retaining the role of the state 
in affording remedies for individual rights violations or encouraging account-
ability and pluralism within the group.136
In light of the osce Ljubljana Guidelines, the operational viability of the 
democratic autonomy proposal as part of an international law-based internal 
self-determination settlement ultimately hinges on a carefully thought-out 
balance between community institutional separation and overall societal 
 cohesion, a process of “mutual accommodation” that combines bottom-up 
group participation and state-led diversity management.
132 See the osce Lund Recommendations, supra note 7, Section iii.14, Explanatory Note.
133 Ibid., Section iii.16.
134 The Democratic Society Congress (supra note 107), for example, endorsed the notion of 
democratic autonomy as being based on “regional and local structures that allow for the 
expression of cultural differences”: Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya and Joost Jongerden, ‘Reassem-
bling the Political: The pkk and the Project of Radical Democracy’, 14 European Journal of 
Turkish Studies (2012) p. 9.
135 The Court was clear that none of them could “trump” the others in this process.
136 See, for example, European Court of Human Rights, Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, 
Judgment, Applications Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98 & 41344/98, 13 February 2003; Marko, 
supra note 64.
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5 Conclusions: Aligning Democratic Autonomy with International 
Human Rights Law
In this article I have examined the international legal dimension of the 
“democratic solution” to the Kurdish question as proposed and thoroughly de-
bated by the Kurdish movement, with particular reference to internal self- 
determination in Turkey. More specifically, I have sought to fill the gap be-
tween  the political articulation and analysis of the Kurdish democratic 
autonomy argument and a view of its internal coherence and consistency un-
der international human rights law, regardless of Turkey’s international legal 
obligations.137
Following on from a discussion of the main strands of the Kurdish argument 
and their ramifications in terms of identity recognition, institutional reform, 
and rights protection for all, I have explored the interface of the democratic 
autonomy proposal with the conceptual and practical underpinnings of inter-
national human rights standards. I have done so by first addressing the legal 
position of the Kurds as an ethno-cultural or ethno-national community and 
then considering the international legal background to the Kurdish argument 
per se. This has been followed by an assessment of the implications of the 
democratic autonomy proposal for internal self-determination (in Turkey), 
 increasingly understood in international and constitutional legal discourse as 
a dialogic institutional and relational process designed to give some form of 
recognition to well-supported sub-state national claims.
Several key elements of the democratic autonomy concept closely engage 
international human rights standards in general, and the evolving notion of 
internal self-determination in particular, including the discursive shift from 
secession or independence to the reconfiguration of the internal regime, the 
137 As the articulation of the piece has, I hope, made clear, this approach does not in any way 
downplay Turkey’s treaty and customary law minimum obligations (let alone a “droit de 
regard” of other states and international institutions over those obligations; for the erga 
omnes character of self-determination, see e.g., East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 30 June 
1995, icj, Judgment, para. 29). In fact, much of the discussion implicitly or explicitly mir-
rors Turkey’s international legal position, including a legal duty to seriously consider 
Kurdish demands (as set out in section 2) by allowing an effective process of participation 
by, and dialogue with the Kurdish movement, independently of specific institutional out-
comes (for even more preliminary legal “essentials” relating to education in private 
schools or the non-discriminatory allocation of public funding, see Kolcak, supra note 6, 
p. 77 et seq.). Rather, the focus of the article – its very purpose – is to engage with the 
“other side” of the argument – precisely, the Kurdish argument – as a way of deepening 
one’s understanding of what is actually at stake on the Kurdish side and encouraging a 
legally informed space of reflection that can reach out to the Kurdish movement itself.
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prioritisation of political and cultural pluralism, the emphasis on participa-
tion  in and community control over decision-making processes, the histori-
cal   record of the Kurdish conflict and the resilience of Kurdish demands as 
central justifications for current claims to territorial and non-territorial self- 
government, broader calls for the decentralisation of power throughout the 
country, and the inclusive view of Kurdish-populated areas – indeed, Kurdis-
tan as a whole – as territories comprising of both Kurdish and non-Kurdish 
groups.
Other elements would benefit from further conceptual refining. In this con-
text I have argued that, despite the non-ethnocentric notion of “democratic 
nation” endorsed by the democratic autonomy proposal, the Kurdish argu-
ment could have more conceptual and legal purchase by flexibly relating the 
Kurds as a socio-cultural reality to various multi-layered, legal iterations of 
Kurdish claims and institutional goals than through the exclusive language of 
“peoplehood” or “nationhood” per se. I have also argued that radical institu-
tional forms of transnationalism (beyond more limited trans-border contacts) 
or, conversely, localism, within Kurdish areas, though conceptually possible 
and legally consistent with the state’s territorial integrity, may in practice prove 
problematic. This is so either because of the lack of advanced regional 
 intergovernmental cooperation and a regulated kin-state involvement as the 
necessary pre-conditions for a treaty-based regulatory framework (transna-
tionalism), or primarily because self-government arrangements relating to in-
ternational mechanisms of group accommodation (local self-government) are 
largely concerned with regional autonomy rather than self-government at 
 municipal or village level (except in fairly specific circumstances). In addition, 
I have noted that the concept of “non-state” participation (also articulated as a 
“stateless democracy”) rightly appeals to the drive for grass-root involvement 
and a community-centred approach – arguably the most salient feature of the 
democratic autonomy proposal – and to that extent, it discursively (strategi-
cally) reinforces the call for a pluralistic process that works towards empower-
ing the Kurds in Turkey and across Kurdistan. However, in practice it cannot do 
away with the state framework within which democratic autonomy needs 
 operating, both in terms of securing greater representation and influence over 
decision-making through the electoral process, and in the sense of distinguish-
ing democratic autonomy as an associative private law-based platform for 
 addressing concerns within the Kurdish community from the institutional 
(constitutional) entrenchment of one variant or another of self-government. 
Cultural (non-territorial) autonomy, deployed as an important complement 
to any territorial arrangement in Turkey – probably the closest reflection of 
direct group participation that informs the whole of the democratic autonomy 
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 proposal – is no exception to that, since it ordinarily neither confers legislative 
or tax powers on the community nor dispenses with the role of the state in 
fostering a participatory process that is meant to establish criteria around the 
legal status, competences and financing of the new entity, as well as affording 
remedies for breaches of individual rights.138 I have argued that the viability of 
democratic autonomy in Turkey from an internal self-determination perspec-
tive (as dynamically understood in this article) hinges on a process of “mutual 
accommodation” (in the words of the osce Ljubljana Guidelines) that com-
bines bottom-up participation and state-led diversity management.
Needless to say, the current and widely known political scenario in Turkey, 
which has led inter alia to the imprisonment of significant parts of the pro-
Kurdish leadership,139 is anything but conducive to such a process. Moving 
away from the “Kurdish opening” of the pre-2015 political phase,140 such politi-
cal reversal is further compounded by what appears to be an incremental dis-
engagement of Turkey from international human rights institutions, as well as 
renewed military confrontations within Turkey and across the Middle East.141 
While the reasons for Turkey’s chronic hostility towards a permanent resolu-
tion of the Kurdish question and what this tells us about the role of interna-
tional law in this context can only be the subject of a separate, future analysis, 
it is fairly clear that the inevitable need for a settlement at some later stage will 
require not only Turkey’s compliance with its own human rights obligations, 
but also the Kurdish movement’s ability to negotiate the accommodation of its 
aspirations in ways that are consistent with international human rights law. 
The foregoing assessment suggests that this is more likely to happen through 
continually adjustable rather than fixed institutional goals, along the legal 
 continuum implicitly or explicitly opened up by the democratic autonomy 
proposal.
138 Suksi, supra note 84, p. 112; Marko, supra note 64, p. 245; Prina et al., supra 78, pp. 
102–103.
139 European Court of Human Rights, Selahattin Demirtas v. Turkey (No.3), Judgment, Appli-
cation No. 8732/11, 9 July 2019; Selahattin Demirtas v. Turkey (No.2), Judgment, Application 
No. 14305/17, 20 November 2018. For a succinct review of recent developments including 
the reversals of gains in addressing the Kurdish question after the two 2015 general elec-
tions and the failed military coup from 2016, see Thomas James Phillips, ‘The (In-)Validity 
of Turkey’s Reservation to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’, 26 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2019) pp. 2–4.
140 Elçin Aktoprak, ‘Between Authoritarianism and Peace: The Kurdish Opening in Turkey 
(2013–2015)’, in Nimni and Aktoprak (eds.), supra note 9, p. 137.
141 See supra notes 6, 7.
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